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ABSTRACT
Recently, various fiscal policies are adopted to overcome severe recessions caused by
the Financial Crisis and the Great Recession in many advanced countries. In this
dissertation, I focus on the effects of those various fiscal policies on the aggregate
economy.
In the first study, I examine the state-dependent effects of government debt on
government spending multipliers. First, I estimate the spending multipliers condi-
tional on the level of government debt using US historical data and the two-state
direct projection method. The empirical results show that the estimated short-run
multipliers in a high debt state are larger than those in a low debt state, which con-
traries to the conventional prediction. Second, I find evidence to support that the
government spending significantly differ by the level of government debt. To under-
stand large short-run multipliers in a high debt state, I construct a New Keynesian
model to explain the large short-run multipliers in a high debt state. The model
suggests that the interaction between the state-dependent government spending rule
and monetary policy could be a potential channel to understand the large short-run
multipliers in a high debt state.
In the second study, I investigate the time-varying relation between government
budget balances and external balances to test the twin deficit hypothesis. Through
a time-varying structural VAR model and the post World War II data for the US
economy, I find new time-varying patterns. To provide some insights about the
empirical facts, I construct a small open economy New Keynesian model incorporated
rule-of-thumb consumers suggested by Gali et al. [2007b]. A shift in exchange rate
regimes and slow-adjusting taxes seem to be be useful to understand the empirical
results.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
This dissertation investigates macroeconomic aspects of fiscal policy. Fiscal policy
has recently attracted renewed attention since various fiscal tools have been adopted
to stimulate the economy in many countries during the recent severe recession. Fur-
thermore, the effects of fiscal consolidation on the economy are currently actively
discussed, since many advanced countries suffer from high levels of government debt.
However, no consensus on the effects of fiscal policy has been reached. This dis-
sertation aims to contribute to this ongoing debate on the effects of fiscal policy
using various empirical methods and simple theoretical models to provide potential
channels to understand the empirical results.
In the second chapter, “Government spending multipliers and public indebted-
ness: an investigation for the US,” I examine whether government spending mul-
tipliers vary depending on the level of government debt.1 In the aftermath of the
financial crisis and the Great Recession, many advanced countries raised government
spending financed by debt to boost private activity and therefore government debt
levels sharply escalated. However, a strand of theoretical literature argues that an
increase in government spending could be contractionary when the debt levels ex-
ceed some threshold. This is because a high level of government debt could lead a
rise in interest rate through sovereign default risks and low future disposable income
through increases in future distortionary taxes due to the tightly binding govern-
ment budget constraint. According to this view, multipliers in a high debt state are
smaller than those in a low debt state and could even be negative. If multipliers
are less than unity, government spending is unlikely to stimulate private activity. If
1
multipliers are negative, recent fiscal consolidation in many advanced countries is
not necessarily accompanied by economic downturns.
To contribute to this important policy-related question, this paper estimates
spending multipliers conditional on the level of government debt using estimated
state-dependent impulse responses based on the average behavior of the economy in
each state. For the estimation, a new quarterly US historical debt series from 1890 to
2010 is constructed. Two important results are obtained. Two important empirical
results arise. First, the estimated multipliers significantly differ by the level of debt.
Surprisingly, the estimated short-run multipliers in a high debt state are larger than
those in a low debt state, which is contrary to the conventional prediction. Second, I
do not find strong evidence to support a large increase in distortionary taxes, and a
sharp rise in interest rate in a high debt state. The responses of 10-year government
bond interest rate do not statistically differ across states. Furthermore, the calcu-
lated tax fraction of government spending does not seem to provide strong evidence
to support that the government may prefer tax-financed spending in a high debt
state. Instead, I find some evidence to support that the government may try to sta-
bilize debt levels by limiting debt-financed spending and subsequent future spending
cuts below the trend in a high debt state. The responses of government spending,
and debt in a low debt state are strongly positive, whereas those in a high debt state
are weak and turn negative at some point. To understand large short-run multipliers
in a high debt state, I suggest a simple New Keynesian model. The previous theo-
retical studies focus on the role of future taxes to stabilize debt levels and ignore the
role of future spending cuts. However, the model shows that the state-dependent
government spending rule in which spending cuts in response to a rise in debt take
place more strongly in a high debt state could be a potential candidate to understand
the large short-run multiplier in a high debt state.
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In the third chapter, “Structural changes? Fiscal policy and twin deficits in a time
varying structural VAR,” I investigate the time-varying effects of government budget
balances on trade balances. In the aftermath of the financial crisis and the Great
Recession, many developed and developing countries suffer from huge budget deficits
and external deficits, and a number of countries have faced the challenge of reducing
both budget deficits and external deficits. In fact, the challenge is closely related
to the twin deficit hypothesis: budget deficits cause external deficits. Although the
hypothesis has important policy implications for recent economic situations, previous
studies provide somewhat mixed evidence on this issue. Furthermore, a large number
of studies detect structural changes in the relation between budget balances and
external balances, but the previous quantitative studies on this issue ignore the
effects of those structural breaks.
To evaluate the time-varying relation between budget balances and external bal-
ances, I estimate a time varying structural vector autoregressive model using post-
World War II US data. The following four empirical results arise: (1) In the Bretton
Woods era, an exogenous increase in government spending and consequent budget
deficits lead trade deficits. (2) Conversely, an increase in government spending in-
duces trade surpluses in the post-Bretton Woods era. (3) Anomaly in the 1980s:
trade deficits are caused by an increase in government spending in the 1980s in spite
of the adoption of a floating exchange regime in the US. (4) The response of terms-
of-trade is stable for the entire periods: Appreciation (increase in the real value of
the dollar) after an initial small depreciation. To provide some insights about empir-
ical results, I construct a small open economy New Keynesian model incorporating
rule-of-thumb consumers suggested by Gali et al. (2007). A shift in exchange rate
regimes seems to be useful to understand the results (1) and (2). Slow-adjusting
taxes seem be useful to understand the result (3).
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CHAPTER II
GOVERNMENT SPENDING MULTIPLIERS AND PUBLIC INDEBTEDNESS:
AN INVESTIGATION FOR THE U.S.*
II.1 Introduction
In the aftermath of the financial crisis and the Great Recession, many advanced
countries increased government spending to boost private activity. These increases in
spending were mainly financed by debt and therefore government debt levels sharply
escalated. In the US, for example, the gross federal debt-to-GDP ratio rose from
60% in 2007 to 90% in 2010. In this circumstance, questions naturally arise: do
government spending multipliers vary depending on the level of government debt? If
so, which channel drives those relations?
The conventional wisdom argues that spending multipliers become smaller or
could even be negative when a level of debt exceeds some threshold. They suggest
two potential channels: the interest rate channel, and the distortionary tax channel.
If a level of government debt exceeds a threshold and sovereign default risks sharply
increase, interest rate also sharply increases. This high level of interest rate possibly
offsets stimulus effects of government spending. Furthermore, fiscal adjustments
by increasing in future distortionary taxes are likely to take place in a high debt
state due to the tightly binding government budget constraint. In this circumstance,
households would increase precautionary savings rather than consumption due to
expected low future disposable income caused by that increase in future distortionary
*Part of this chapter is reprinted with permission from “Do government spending multipliers
depend on the level of government debt? US historical data evidence” by Wongi Kim, 2015. Applied
Economics Letters, 22(8), 668 - 672, Copyright [2015].
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taxes, which could reduce spending multipliers in a high debt state.1 If spending
multipliers are below unity due to the high level of debt, an increase in government
spending is not an efficient way to stimulate private activity in a high debt state.
In contrast to this conventional prediction, this paper argues that spending mul-
tipliers could be larger when the debt-to-GDP ratio exceeds a threshold, at least, in
short run. To this end, I provide some empirical and theoretical evidence to support
the claim. In the empirical part, I estimate the spending multipliers conditional on
the level of government debt using the defense news variable proposed by Ramey
[2011a] to identify a spending shock, a newly constructed US historical quarterly
debt data from 1890.Q1 to 2010.Q4, and the two-state direct projection method.
The results provide some favor evidence to support the claim. In the theoretical
part, I construct a closed economy New Keynesian model to propose a potential
channel to explain the large short-run multipliers in a high debt state.
A key in the construction of spending multipliers is identifying an exogenous and
unanticipated spending shock. To this end, I use the narrative approach using the
defense news variable. Previous studies on this issue such as Ilzetzki et al. [2013]
mainly use the standard vector autoregression (VAR) model proposed by Blanchard
and Perotti [2002] to identify a spending shock. As shown in Ramey [2011a], however,
this method may fail to identify a proper spending shock since changes in government
spending are well anticipated long before spending actually changes by private agents
in the economy, and the standard VAR may not properly capture this anticipation.
The defense news variable focuses on the expected discounted value of government
spending changes related to foreign political or military events, so that it is unlikely
to be related to the economic fundamentals and is unanticipated. Thus the narrative
1See Bi [2012] and Corsetti et al. [2013] for the interest rate channel. See Bertola and Drazen
[1993] and Perotti [1999] for the tax channel. Ilzetzki et al. [2013] and Baumeister and Peersman
[2013] provide some empirical evidence to support this view.
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approach using the defense news could help mitigate the bias caused by private
agents’ anticipation of future spending changes. However, it is not straightforward to
use this narrative approach with the existing short time series of debt. The estimation
using the defense news could be interpreted as an instrumental variable approach
and therefore the relevance of defense news for changes in government spending is
important. As shown in Ramey [2011a], however, the defense news variable would not
be a proper instrument in periods after the Korean War.2 To overcome the problem,
I construct a new quarterly US historical government debt series. Additionally, the
sample periods cover World War II (WWII), in which historical US government debt
peaks, so that I can utilize richer variations than previous studies.
Through the two-state local projection method similar to Auerbach and Gorod-
nichenko [2011], I obtain two important empirical results. First, the spending mul-
tipliers in a high debt state are larger than those in a low debt state, at least, in
short-run. Second, I do not find strong evidence on a large increase in distortionary
taxes and a sharp rise in interest rate in a high debt state, which are potential can-
didates to reduce spending multipliers in a high debt state. The responses of 10-year
government bond interest rate, an indicator of sovereign default risks, do not statis-
tically differ across states. Furthermore, the calculated tax fraction of government
spending does not seem to be strong evidence to support that the government may
prefer tax-financed spending in a high debt state. Instead, I find some evidence
to support that the government may try to stabilize debt levels by limiting debt-
financed spending and subsequent future spending cuts below the trend in a high
debt state. The responses of government spending and debt to a spending shock in
a low debt state are strongly positive, whereas those in a high debt state are weak
2Intuitively, this identification strategy depends on the major war events such as World War
I, World War II, and the Korean War, so that a long time series is necessary to utilize enough
variations.
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and turn negative at some point.
To understand the large short-run multipliers in a high debt state, I construct
a simple New Keynesian model. The previous theoretical studies focus on the role
of taxes to stabilize debt levels and ignore the role of government spending. How-
ever, the empirical results support that the government spending heavily depends
on the level of government debt. In particular, an increase in government spending
is accompanied by future spending cuts in response to a rise in debt in a high debt
state. However, those future spending cuts are not observed in a low debt state.
Based on this finding, I introduce a state-dependent government spending rule in
the standard New Keynesian. In the model, future spending cuts in response to
a rise in debt are assumed to take place only when the level of debt is sufficiently
high. Those planned future spending cuts in a high debt state could reduce future
inflation and, via monetary authority’s reaction function, future real interest rate.
Since households anticipate lower future real interest rate, they increase their current
consumption through the intertemporal substitution mechanism, which could mag-
nify short-run stimulus effects. However, because future spending cuts do not take
place in a low debt state, government spending crowds out households consumption
through the interest rate channel. This result may imply that future spending cuts in
response to a rise in debt in a high debt state and interaction between those spending
cuts and monetary policy could be a key to generate the large short-run multipliers
in a high debt state.
There are several studies on the state-dependent effects of government debt on
spending multipliers. On the theoretical side, the conventional wisdom argues that
spending multipliers in a high debt state are smaller than those in a low debt state
because of large distortions induced by distortionary taxes. For example, Perotti
[1999] shows that an increase in government spending could reduce aggregate con-
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sumption when the initial level of debt is high. In his model, an increase in gov-
ernment spending increases the consumption of liquidity constrained households. At
the same time, that increase in government spending reduces the consumption of
liquidity unconstrained households since they expect low future disposable income
due to an increase in future distortionary taxes. When the initial level of debt is low
and distortion are sufficiently small, an increase in government spending increases
aggregate consumption. However, if the initial level of debt is high, so are tax dis-
tortions, aggregate consumption could be negative. Bertola and Drazen [1993], and
Sutherland [1997] also provide similar theoretical predictions. In addition, Bi [2012],
and Corsetti et al. [2013] propose an alternative channel, the so-called sovereign risk
channel. They show that an increase in spending in a high debt state could lead
a sharp rise in interest rate and private funding costs via an increase in sovereign
default risks, which possibly offsets stimulus effects.
Moreover, recent empirical studies provide some evidence on state-dependent
effects of debt on spending multipliers.3 Ilzetzki et al. [2013] show that the spending
multipliers in high debt periods are negative and smaller than those in low debt
periods regardless of horizons using country panel data and the structural VAR
(SVAR) model. Baumeister and Peersman [2013] show the similar results using panel
data on the Euro countries and a panel VAR model. Herna´ndez de Cos and Moral-
Benito [2013] also conclude that the spending multipliers in a high debt state are
smaller than those in a low debt state using a smooth transition VAR (STVAR) and
3In this paper, I focus on the state-dependent effects of debt on spending multipliers, but a
growing body of empirical literature shows that spending multipliers depend on various economic
conditions. For example, Auerbach and Gorodnichenko [2011], Auerbach and Gorodnichenko [2012],
Fazzari et al. [2013], Baum et al. [2012], Owyang et al. [2013], and Ramey and Zubairy [2014]
investigate spending multipliers that depend on business cycle conditions. Ramey and Zubairy
[2014] also consider the effects of the zero lower bound. Corsetti et al. [2012b], Ilzetzki et al. [2013],
and Born et al. [2013a] estimate the effects of exchange rate regimes on multipliers. Ilzetzki et al.
[2013] also consider openness to trade. Corsetti et al. [2012b] consider the effects of financial crises.
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Spain data. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko [2011] show that the spending multiplier
in a recession with the high level of debt is smaller than that in a recession with the
low level of debt using OECD data. However, neither of them provides a specific
channel to understand the state-dependent effects of debt on spending multipliers.
In contrast to these studies, Corsetti et al. [2012b] show a little bit different result.
They estimate several types of state-dependent spending multipliers using OECD
panel data and a two-step econometric procedure to identify a spending shock. Their
findings reveal that the spending multipliers in the “weak public finance state” (the
debt-to-GDP ratio exceeds 100% or the deficit-to-GDP ratio exceeds 5%) are not
different from those in the “normal state”. Furthermore, their results show that
the response of consumption in the “weak public finance state” is positive, whereas
that in the “normal state” is negative, which is sharply contrary to the conventional
wisdom as shown in Perotti [1999].4
Although these empirical studies provide some evidence on the question, the
method to identify a spending shock is up for debate. Most of the empirical studies
regarding this issue use the SVAR approach to identify a spending shock.5 After the
pioneering studies by Blanchard and Perotti [2002] and Fata´s and Mihov [2001], the
SVAR model has been widely adopted to measure fiscal multipliers. In the SVAR
model, government spending is assumed to be predetermined within the quarter.
Under this assumption, the residuals of government spending from a regression of
government spending on its own lags and lags of other variables in the VAR could be
4There is a strand of empirical literature which emphasizes the impact of debt on government
spending using a linear framework. For example, Favero and Giavazzi [2007], and Chung and Leeper
[2007] show that debt plays an important role in determining the effects of government spending
on the economy. However, they do not consider the state-dependent effects of government debt.
5An exception is Auerbach and Gorodnichenko [2011]. They identify a spending shock using
the forecasting errors of government spending. This method could mitigate the effects of private
agents’ anticipation of future spending changes. Corsetti et al. [2012b] use a two-step procedure
to identify a shock, but the meaning of this identification method is not different from the SVAR
approach because a spending shock is identified by conditioning on past information.
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interpreted as a structural spending shock, and the identification is easily achieved
by placing government spending first in the VAR and the Choleski decomposition.6
This identification strategy is easily implemented and widely adopted, but it is not
uncontroversial. Ramey [2011a] points out that the government spending shocks
identified by the SVAR are predictable and well anticipated by the private agents in
the economy, which could lead us to reach incorrect conclusions because anticipated
policy changes have somewhat different consequences compared with unanticipated
policy changes. Taylor [1993] shows how differently the economy responds to an-
ticipated changes and unanticipated changes in monetary policy and fiscal policy.
Auerbach and Gorodnichenko [2012] show that controlling for predictable compo-
nents of fiscal shocks tends to increase the size of the multipliers. Leeper et al. [2013]
also show, using a theoretical model, that it is not easy to recover the true struc-
tural policy shock using standard VAR methods when private agents in the economy
anticipate future policy changes. To mitigate this bias, Ramey [2011a] proposes the
narrative approach using the defense news variable.7 This identification method is
adopted by Hall [2009], Barro and Redlick [2011], and Ramey and Zubairy [2014] to
estimate US spending multipliers. Particularly, Ramey and Zubairy [2014] estimate
state-dependent spending multipliers using US historical data and the narrative ap-
proach, which is similar to this work. However, they focus on whether the economy
has slack or not, and the nominal interest rate zero lower bound, and do not consider
debt-related issues.
6Ramey [2011b] provides a summary of the results in the literature that use the SVAR model.
7There are other methods to identify a spending shock. For example, Mountford and Uhlig
[2009] use a sign restriction to identify a spending shock. Fisher and Peters [2010] construct a
narrative record to identify a spending shock using the stock returns in the US.
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II.2 Data and Econometric Method
In this section, I provide detailed descriptions of data and econometric methods.
Section II.2.1 refers to a description of data and section II.2.2 explains econometric
methods.
II.2.1 Data
The main question addressed in the paper is whether government spending multi-
pliers depend on the level of government debt. To answer this question, I estimate
state-dependent effects of government debt on spending multipliers using US his-
torical data constructed by Owyang et al. [2013] and Shiller [2005] except the data
on government debt. The data constructed by Owyang et al. [2013] covers sev-
eral macroeconomic variables such as government spending, GDP, GDP deflator,
population and the defense news variable from 1890 to 2010 at quarterly frequency.
Particularly, the defense news variable is the extended series of Ramey [2011a]’s news
variable. For interest rate, I use the series of 10-year government bond interest rate
constructed by Shiller [2005].8 Note that the government spending data constructed
by Owyang et al. [2013] includes government consumption, and investment and does
not include government transfer payments.
One of the contributions of this paper is constructing a new quarterly US govern-
ment debt series from 1890.Q1 to 2010.Q4 based on two sources: monthly statement
of public debt and treasury bulletin. Both of them are issued by the US treasury.
Appendix B refers to a detailed description of the construction process, but I high-
light some features of the US government debt constructed here. The government
debt constructed here is the gross federal debt which is the broadest measure of gov-
8Perotti [2004] points out that long-term interest rate is arguably more important to determine
private consumption and investment than short-term interest rate.
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ernment debt. The series includes debt held by public and debt held by trust funds
such as the Social Security Trust fund. Cashell [2010] claims that debt held by public
is more relevant to measure the burden of government debt than gross debt since all
gross debt, especially debt held by trust funds, do not represent past borrowing in
credit markets. However, the debt held by public series is not available for entire
sample periods. Moreover, the debt limit in the US is determined based on gross
debt, not debt held by public, and several studies such as Reinhart and Rogoff [2010]
also use gross debt as a measure of government debt in their research. Thus gross
debt could be a reasonable measure of the burden of government debt. Furthermore,
quarterly data is more relevant to capture sudden changes of the state of the economy
than annual data since government debt sometimes increases sharply.9 Additionally,
annual data is not free from the private agents’ anticipation even though a shock is
identified by the defense news, as pointed out in Ramey [2011a]. Thus high frequency
data is more useful to measure multipliers.
II.2.2 Econometric Method
Following Auerbach and Gorodnichenko [2011] and Owyang et al. [2013], I employ
Jorda´ [2005]’s local projection method to estimate state-dependent impulse response
functions. The local projection method enables me to draw impulse responses directly
by estimating a series of linear regressions for each impulse response horizon h for
each variable of interest. Consider the following state-dependent model in which
responses vary across states.
9For example, the debt-to-GDP in 1942.Q1 was 40%, but that rose 80% in 1943.Q3.
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yt+h = γ2,ht+ γ3,ht
2 + γ4,ht
3 + It−1
[
γH1,h +
j∑
i=1
AHi,hxt−i + β
H
h shockt
]
+ (1− It−1)
[
γL1,h +
j∑
i=1
ALi,hxt−i + β
L
h shockt
]
+ εt+h, h = 0, 1, 2, · · · , n (1)
y is a variable of interest. I use pre-transformed GDP and government spending as
y variables following Barro and Redlick [2011] and Ramey and Zubairy [2014]. To
be specific, the y variable for the GDP and the government spending equation have
the following form:
Yt+h − Yt−1
Yt−1
≈ lnYt+h − lnYt−1 , Gt+h −Gt−1
Yt−1
≈ (lnGt+h − lnGt−1)Gt−1
Yt−1
(2)
where Y is real per capita GDP, and G is real per capita government spending.
The former is percentage deviations of GDP and is analogous to the form in the
standard fiscal VAR. The latter is the transformation of percentage changes in gov-
ernment spending to dollar changes using G/Y at each period in time. With this
form, changes in government spending and output are measured in the same unit,
which is required to calculate multipliers. Furthermore, this particular form helps
avoiding the bias in calculating multipliers. In the standard fiscal VAR, multipliers
are usually calculated by multiplying estimated elasticity of GDP with respect to
government spending by the sample mean of the government spending-to-GDP ra-
tio. This method delivers reasonable multipliers if the ratio is stable. If the ratio
fluctuates widely, however, multipliers calculated by this method could be biased,
as shown in Ramey and Zubairy [2014]. Since this particular form converts percent
changes into dollar changes using a value of the ratio at each point in time, rather
than using a sample mean of the ratio, it is possible to avoid the bias caused by
using the sample mean.10 I also estimate the equation with log of debt, and interest
10The data that I use show that the whole sample mean of the ratio is 8, the minimum is 2 and
the maximum is 24. The post WWII sample mean is 5, the minimum is 4 and the maximum is 7.
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rate as y variables to investigate state-dependent behavior of government debt and
interest rate.
I is an indicator variable that has the value of one when the debt-to-GDP ratio
exceeds a predetermined threshold, and is zero otherwise. The debt-to-GDP ratio is
widely adopted in several literature such as Bohn [1998], Perotti [1999], and Ilzetzki
et al. [2013] to measure the level of debt. For the baseline estimation, the threshold
is set 45%.11 If the threshold is set 0, the state-dependent model becomes the linear
model in which responses are invariant across states. Figure 1 shows the time series
plot of the debt-to-GDP ratio and the news variable. The high debt state consists
of two periods: from the beginning of the 1940s to the mid-1960s and from the mid-
1980s to the present day. Because of substantial military spending during WWII and
the Korean War, the debt-to-GDP ratio exceeds the threshold and the news variable
show sizeable variations during the first period. Additionally, the high level of debt
in the second period is caused by significant tax reductions enacted by the Reagan
and the Bush administrations, and the aftermath of the recent financial crisis and
subsequent great recession.
x is a vector of control variables. For the baseline model, I control the following
variables: log of real per capita government spending, log of real per capita GDP, log
of real per capita debt, and 10-year government bond interest rate. Including debt
and interest rate would be helpful to capture debt-financing costs for the government.
For robustness checks, moreover, I control the effects of tax policy using the series of
tax rate constructed by Barro and Redlick [2011] and updated by Mertens [2013].12
The lag for the controls j is set 4.13
11This number is not econometrically chosen but I tested several levels and find that the results
with 45% and above are different from the results with levels below 45%. Ilzetzki et al. [2013] use
a similar strategy to identify the break point.
12This series is available only in some sub-periods, thus I use that only for robustness checks.
13I estimate the model with different lags from 2 to 6. The results are robust to different lag
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shock is a government spending shock identified by the defense news variable
constructed by Ramey [2011a] and Owyang et al. [2013]. It is important to identify an
exogenous and unanticipated government spending shock, so that I use the narrative
approach using the defense new variable. The narrative approach using defense news
is relatively free from the common criticism of the structural VAR method proposed
by Blanchard and Perotti [2002] and Fata´s and Mihov [2001]. I use the defense new
variable scaled by one-period lagged nominal GDP to normalize the size of a shock.
One important issue in the narrative approach using the defense news is the
relevance of the defense news variable. Ramey [2011a] points out that the estimation
with the defence news variable could be interpreted as an instrumental variable
regression. Consequently, it is important to know whether the defense news is a
relevant instrument. Following Ramey [2011a], I conduct the F-test to test the
relevance. Table 1 shows the results. In all cases except the high debt state, the
F-statistics are well above the threshold level 10.14 The marginal F-statistics for the
high debt state is slightly below 10, but it is substantially higher than F-statistics of
other instrumental variables in macroeconomic studies.15 Overall, the results indicate
that the news variable is relevant to accounting for changes in government spending.
Moreover, observations for the high debt state is about 40% of entire observations,
so that it is sufficient to capture state-dependent effects of government debt.
In addition, a cubic trend is included for the baseline estimation. Ramey and
Zubairy [2014] emphasize that the importance of a higher order trend to capture
slow moving demographics. According to Jorda´ [2005], moreover, the error term
εt+h is a moving average of the forecast errors from t to t + h. To correct the
effects of the serial correlated errors, I use the Newey-West standard error. In this
structure.
14The typical rule-of-thumb level is 10. See Staiger and Stock [1997].
15See Stock and Watson [2012]
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specification, the collection of {βHh }h=0,··· ,n could be interpreted as a response of y in
a high debt state, while the collection of {βLh }h=0,··· ,n means a response of y in a low
debt state. For example, βH4 represents a response of y to a shock after 4 quarter in
a high debt state. Furthermore, the cumulative multiplier which I focus on in this
paper is calculated by the following:
CM ik =
∑k
h=0 ∆Y
i
h∑k
h=0 ∆G
i
h
=
∑k
h=0 β
i
h,Y∑k
h=0 β
i
h,G
, i = H,L (3)
where ∆ means a response of a variable to a defense news shock, and subscripts Y and
G indicate the GDP equation and the government spending equation, respectively.
k is a horizon of interest.16
The local projection has several advantages comparing to nonlinear VAR models.
The local projection is flexible to choose a form of variables. In this empirical analy-
sis, the dependent variables and independent variables have different forms to avoid
the bias in calculating multipliers. This is not easily implemented in VAR models.
Second, nonlinear VAR models sometimes need an assumption on how a shock in-
teracts with a state of the economy to calculate impulse responses. For example,
Auerbach and Gorodnichenko [2012] assume that the economy stays in its current
state for a long time regardless of a shock for their STVAR to simplify drawing im-
pulse responses. In contrast to nonlinear VAR models, the local projection method
utilizes the average behavior of the economy. Thus, it does not depend on such a
specific assumption.17
16Mountford and Uhlig [2009] and Fisher and Peters [2010] argue that the multiplier relevant
for policy makers is the cumulative multiplier.
17Auerbach and Gorodnichenko [2011] and Ramey and Zubairy [2014] also provide a nice sum-
mary on nonlinear VAR models and the local projection method.
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II.3 Baseline Results
This section provides baseline estimation results. Figure 2 shows the estimated
impulse response of GDP, government spending, interest rate, and government debt
to an increase in the defense news by 1% of GDP in the liner model (threshold is set
0%) as a benchmark. The responses of government spending and GDP are positive
and reach the maximum at 12 quarters after a shock. The response of interest rate is
negative, which is consistent with several studies such as Perotti [2004] and Ramey
[2011a]. After a shock, government debt begins increasing and peaks around 17
quarters.
Figure 3 shows the responses of the variables in the state-dependent model. In
a low debt state, government spending, GDP, and debt have positive and robust
responses as in the linear model. The responses of government spending and GDP in
a low debt state peak around 14 quarters, and debt has a peak around 17 quarters.
In a high debt state, however, the responses become totally different. Government
spending has a weak response and turns negative after 15 quarters, and debt has only
a small and statistically insignificant response. The response of government spending
could be interpreted as the government tries to stabilize debt levels through limiting
debt-financed spending and future reductions in spending below the trend in a high
debt state, whereas the government cares less about debt levels in a low debt state.
In contrast to most theoretical works in which government spending is treated as
a purely exogenous process,18 existing empirical literature support that government
spending is systematically reduced by an increase in government debt.19 How could
18For example, Gali et al. [2007a] and Woodford [2011] assume that the government spending
rule follows the pure autoregressive process, which implies that budget deficits are corrected only
by tax increases.
19For example, Gal´ı and Perotti [2003], Reicher [2012] (single equation approaches), Chung
and Leeper [2007], Corsetti et al. [2012a] (VAR models), Leeper et al. [2010], and Zubairy [2014]
(estimated DSGE models) provide such evidence. In particular, Corsetti et al. [2012a] provide
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we interpret that systematic reductions in spending caused by government debt?
One way to interpret is that the government tries to stabilize government debt levels
through not only tax increases but also spending cuts. Bohn [1991] and Auerbach
[2000] show that historically US budget deficits have been corrected by combination
of both spending cuts and tax increases. Furthermore, recent fiscal consolidation
through spending cuts in many advanced countries is also matched to this interpre-
tation.20
However, those systematic reductions in spending to stabilize debt levels possibly
take place in a nonlinear manner. Several empirical studies, typically on the debt
sustainability, suggest that behavior of fiscal instruments significantly differs by the
level of debt (or the size of budget deficits). For example, Bohn [1998] estimates
how US primary budget surpluses respond to debt using a single equation approach
and finds that the marginal response of budget surpluses to debt is positive and
statistically significant when the debt-to-GDP ratio is above the sample average,
whereas that is negative and statistically insignificant when the debt-to-GDP ratio
is below the sample average. Afonso and Sousa [2012] and Checherita-Westphal
and Rother [2012] also show similar results.21 Those results would imply that the
evidence for the US suggesting that an exogenous increase in government spending leads a rise in
government debt, and that rise in debt causes future reductions in spending below trend, called
spending reversals. Those spending reversals are observed in a high debt state in this paper.
20For instance, the US Congressional budget office announces that federal discretionary spending
will be reduced from 7.2% of GDP in 2013 to 5.2% in 2024 to reduce budget deficits and to stabilize
government debt levels. Furthermore, some researchers claim that spending cuts are more efficient
to reduce debt levels and enhancing future growth than tax increases. See Alesina and Perotti
[1995] and Alesina and Ardagna [2009].
21Afonso and Sousa [2012] show that government spending responds to debt more negatively
when the debt-to-GDP ratio exceeds some threshold in the US using estimating a VAR model
incorporated the debt-feedback equation as in Favero and Giavazzi [2007]. Checherita-Westphal
and Rother [2012] also show that the impact of debt on government investment is positive when the
debt-to-GDP ratio is below some threshold, whereas that turns negative when the debt-to-GDP
ratio exceeds that threshold using data on euro countries. Moreover, Sarno [2001], Arestis et al.
[2004], Cipollini et al. [2009], and Piergallini and Postigliola [2013] also provide similar evidence. In
particular, Arestis et al. [2004], and Cipollini et al. [2009] show that the government only intervenes
to reduce budget deficits mainly through spending cuts when the deficits exceed a certain threshold
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systematic reductions in spending to stabilize debt levels take place more strongly
or abruptly when the debt-to-GDP ratio exceeds some threshold.
The responses of government spending in this paper are in line with those nonlin-
ear behavior of stabilizing debt levels. The weak and negative response of government
spending to an exogenous spending shock in a high debt state may imply that the
government tries to avoid increasing in debt-financed spending and reduce spending
below the trend to stabilize debt levels in a high debt state. As a result, debt has a
small and insignificant response in a high debt state. In contrast to the response of
spending in a high debt state, the response of spending in a low debt state is strong
and robust, which would imply that the government less cares about increasing in
spending financed by debt in a low debt state. Consequently, debt has a strong and
robust response in a low debt state. Thus it would be reasonable to interpret the
results as the government tends to put large efforts to stabilize debt levels through
limiting debt-financed spending and subsequent spending reductions in response to
an exogenous change in government spending in a high debt state.
The response of GDP in a high debt state is also weak and turns negative after
13 quarters. In contrast to the response of other variables, the responses of interest
rate do not statistically differ across states. Thus I do not find strong evidence to
support interest rate nonlinearity due to default risks in the theoretical literature
such as Bi [2012] and Corsetti et al. [2013]. It may be caused by low default risks to
US government debt.
Figure 4 shows the estimated cumulative multipliers. In the linear model, the
estimated multiplier on impact is 0.88, which implies that an increase in government
spending by $1 induces an increase in GDP by $0.88. The multiplier decreases
soon after, and the 1-year cumulative multiplier becomes 0.67. However, it starts to
in the US.
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increase after 1 year, and the 5-year cumulative multiplier becomes 0.86. All those
numbers are consistent with previous VAR evidence.22 Additionally, the estimated
multipliers are statistically significant at all horizons. The estimated multipliers
in a low debt state show the similar pattern as in the linear model. On impact,
the multiplier is 0.73, which is similar to that in the linear model. The estimated
multiplier decreases soon after, and the 1-year cumulative multiplier becomes 0.58.
However, it begins to increase after 1 year, which is the same as in the linear model,
and the 5-year cumulative multiplier becomes 0.85. Furthermore, the estimated
multipliers in a low debt state are statistically significant at all horizons as in the
linear model. However, the estimated multipliers in a high debt state show the totally
different pattern compared with that observed in the linear model and a low debt
state.23 The estimated multiplier on impact in a high debt state is 2.16 which is much
larger than that in a low debt state, though it is not statistically significant. However,
it is not easy to interpret the statistically insignificant impact multiplier in a high debt
state because the contemporaneous response of GDP in a high debt state is positive
and statistically significant. It seems that the wide confidence band of the impact
multiplier in a high debt state is caused by the large uncertainty of contemporaneous
response of government spending. The multiplier drops sharply soon after, and the
1-year cumulative multiplier becomes 1, which is still larger than that in a low debt
state and statistically significant. In contrast to the linear model and a low debt state
in which the multiplier begins to increase after 1 year, the multipliers in a high debt
state continue to decrease after 1 year, and the 5-year cumulative multiplier becomes
0.43. It implies that the linear model cannot capture the continuously decreasing
cumulative multipliers in a high debt state. Moreover, the results indicate that the
22Hall [2009] suggests that the range of multipliers in VAR literature is between 0.7 and 1.
23Since the confidence band of the multipliers on impact in a high debt state is wide, I report
the figure with trimmed y axis.
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short-run multipliers in a high debt state are not necessarily smaller than those in a
low debt state, which is sharply contrary to the conventional wisdom.24 In contrast
to the finding for short-run multipliers, the long-run multipliers in a high debt state
are smaller than those in a low debt state. For example, the difference of the 5-year
cumulative multiplier in a high debt state and a low debt state is -0.6, and that
difference is statistically significant at the 10% level.
In summary, the responses of government spending, GDP, and debt are signifi-
cantly differ by the level of debt. Those in a low debt state are positive and robust.
However, the responses of government spending and GDP in a high debt state are
weak and turn negative. The response of debt in a high debt state is also weaker
than that in a low debt state. The linear model does not capture the weak and statis-
tically insignificant responses of government spending, GDP and debt in a high debt
state. In contrast to the other variables, the long-term interest rate has the similar
response across states, which may be caused by low default risks to US government
bond. Furthermore, the short-run multipliers in a high debt state are larger than
those in a low debt state, which is sharply contrary to the conventional wisdom.
II.4 Robustness
In this section, I report the various robustness check results. In section II.4.1, the
results with different time trends, thresholds, and other specification are provided.
Section II.4.2 provides the results with the tax rate constructed by Barro and Redlick
[2011] and updated by Mertens [2013] are shown, which helps understanding the role
of taxes.
24I discuss on this difference in section .
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II.4.1 Robustness: Different Time Trends, Thresholds, and Other Specifications
Table 2 shows the results with different time trend and threshold assumptions. The
result with 60% threshold, the same threshold in Ilzetzki et al. [2013], shows the
same implications as in the baseline case. The estimated multipliers in a low debt
state show the same pattern as shown in the baseline model: the multiplier is small
in short-run, but it grows larger in long-run. However, the multipliers in a high debt
state are large in short-run, but those decrease soon after. Moreover, the estimated
short-run multipliers are larger than those in a low debt state. However, the result
with the 35% threshold shows the different results. In this case, both of the short-run
and the long run multipliers in a high debt state are smaller than those in a low debt
state. With a low threshold, two states may not be clearly separated, which possibly
causes different implications.
Furthermore, time series models are sometimes sensitive to a trend assumption,
thus I report the estimation results with different time trends. Note that the sample
periods in this paper are much longer than those in a standard time series analysis,
thus a higher order trend such as a quartic trend could be important. The estimated
multipliers with a quartic trends in a high debt state are slightly lower than those
in the baseline case. However, the short-tun multipliers in a high debt state are still
larger than those in a low debt state. The result with a quadratic trend also gives
the same implication.
Next, I estimate the model with the first difference of the controls instead of
the level of the controls. This specification could mitigate measurement errors of
the variables. The result also confirms that the short-run multipliers in a high debt
state are larger than those in a low debt state. In this case, the 5-year cumulative
multipliers in a high debt state is not much smaller than that in a low debt state.
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Following Barro and Redlick [2011], moreover, I control the lagged unemploy-
ment rate and the credit spreads. They emphasize the importance of unemployment
rate to control the amount of slack in estimating spending multipliers. Moreover,
since the sample period includes the Great Depression and some periods of the fi-
nancial crisis, credit conditions could be important to determine output dynamics as
argued in Barro and Redlick [2011]. To control credit conditions, I use the spreads
between long-maturity Baa-rated corporate bond and 10-year government bond fol-
lowing Barro and Redlick [2011]. This credit spreads may capture credit market
conditions.25 The result also confirms the findings in the baseline case.
It is reasonable to be concerned about the effects of the war time rationing during
WWII. As shown in Perotti [2011], the war time rationing could be source to alter the
estimated spending multipliers. Thus, I report the results with the data excluding
WWII (1939.Q3 to 1946.Q4).26 The result show that the multipliers in a low debt
state are slightly larger than those in the baseline case. However, the short-run
multipliers in a high debt state are still larger than those in a low debt state.
To compare with the previous studies which mainly focus on the post WWII
period, I also report the results with the post WWII data. The result show that the
multipliers in a low debt state are larger than those in a low debt state. However,
the 1-year cumulative multiplier in a high debt state is still larger than those in a
low debt state. The result seems to confirm that the findings in the baseline case.27
25I control 4 lags of the variables. The unemployment series is taken from the data constructed
by Owyang et al. [2013]’s. The series of Baa corporate bond yield is taken from the website of the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. The Baa corporate bond yield series is available after 1919.
Thus the sample periods for the regression with the credit spreads starts 1919.Q1.
26Ramey and Shapiro [1998] point out that the effects of the rationing, the price control and,
the draft during the Korean War and the Vietnam War are small.
27Due to the observation loss, typically for a low debt state, I choose the higher threshold value
for the post-WWII case. Furthermore, I use a quadratic trend which is more conventional in the
estimation with post-WWII period instead of a cubic trend. In addition, it should be careful to
interpret this result since the defense news variable has low explanatory power for post-WWII
government spending, especially in a low debt state. The marginal F-statistic for a high debt state
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Overall, all robustness checks confirm the findings in the baseline model: the
multipliers in a high debt state are not necessarily smaller than those in a low debt
state, at least, in short-run.28
II.4.2 Robustness: Control Tax Policy
Tax policy is another important factor to determine effects of government spending
on output. The conventional wisdom argues that distortionary taxation is a key
to reduce stimulus effects of government spending in a high debt state. Barro and
Redlick [2011] also point out that an increase in tax rate induced by an increase in
government spending possibly affects output negatively. Therefore a channel based
on tax policy could be another source to alter multipliers. In order to control tax
policy, I include federal individual income tax rate (FITR) constructed by Barro and
Redlick [2011] and updated by Mertens [2013] in the estimation equation. This tax
rate is interpreted as distortionary labor income tax rate since Barro and Redlick
[2011] focus on estimating the tax rate closely related to labor income. Note that
the original tax rate series constructed by Barro and Redlick [2011] consists of three
components: FITR, the social security tax rate, and the state tax rate, and I use
FITR which is the main variation source of that series instead of the all components
due to data availability. The original tax rate constructed by Barro and Redlick
[2011] is only available from 1913 to 2006. Fortunately, Mertens [2013] updates
FITR from 2006 to 2010, thus it is possible to minimize the observation loss using
FITR.29 The sample periods are 1913.Q1 to 2010.Q4 due to data availability. The
(threshold is set 60%) is 11.74, but that for a low debt state is only 2.00.
28In addition, I estimate the model with other specifications to check robustness. For example, I
estimate the model with the 3 month treasury bill rate to control the effects of monetary policy. To
control the effects of the zero-lower bound, moreover, I estimate the model with the data excluding
the periods in which the 3 month treasury bill rate is less than 0.25%. The results are not changed.
29The estimation results with the original series constructed by Barro and Redlick [2011] show
the same implications. Moreover, this tax series is only available at annual frequency. Therefore, I
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threshold is set 45% which is the same in the baseline model. Moreover, I control all
the variables in the baseline equation and 4 lags of the tax rate.
Figure 5 shows the response of government spending, GDP, interest rate, debt,
and the tax rate to a rise in the defense news by 1% of GDP in the linear model.
The responses of government spending, GDP, interest rate, and government debt in
the linear model are similar to those in the baseline estimation. Additionally, the
tax rate starts increasing and peaks around 12 quarters after a shock.
Figure 6 shows the state-dependent responses of the variables. The responses of
government spending, GDP, and government debt are similar to the baseline case.
Those are weak and turn negative after some point in a high debt state, whereas
those are positive and robust in a low debt state. The responses of interest rate
are not statistically different across state, which is also similar to the response in the
baseline model. Furthermore, the responses of tax rate differ by the level of debt. The
response of the tax rate in a low debt state is positive and robust, which is similar to
the linear model. In contrast to the response of the tax rate in the linear model and
a low debt state, the response of the tax rate in a high debt state is weak and turns
negative after 14 quarters. Based on the response of the tax rate, I compute the ratio
of the cumulative tax receipts to the cumulative government spending.30 Figure 7
show the results. The result shows that the tax fraction of government spending in
a linear model and a low debt state is around 40% after 1 year. However, the tax
fraction of government spending in a high debt state is somewhat different. At 1
use repeated samples to estimate the equation following Ramey [2011a]. For example, the tax rates
in 2000.Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4 have the same value which is the tax rate in 2000.
30To compute the ratio, I use the following formula: G = deficit+τY , whereG is real government
spending, τ is the tax rate, and Y is real GDP. Then changes in government spending normalized
by output is ∆GY =
∆Deficit
Y + ∆τ + τ
∆Y
Y . With this particular form, I can compute the ratio of tax
receipts to government spending. I assume that the steady-state tax rate, τ , in a high debt state
is 0.22%, which is the sample average of the tax rate in a high debt state and that in a low debt
state is 0.13%. For the linear model, τ is assumed 0.18%, which is the sample average.
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year, more than 70% of cumulative government spending is financed by debt. This
result seems that the government prefers tax-financed spending in a high debt state.
At 5 year, however, less than 30% of cumulative government spending is financed by
debt. This result does not seem to support a large increases in distortionary taxes
in a high debt state. Overall, I do not find strong evidence to support that the
government prefers tax-financed spending in a high debt state. The result provides
mixed evidence at best.
Figure 8 shows the estimated spending multipliers. Overall, the estimated multi-
pliers are similar to those in the baseline model, though the confidence bands become
wider.31 The multiplier on impact in the linear model is 1.24, which is slightly larger
than that in the baseline model. The multiplier decreases until 1 year, but it starts
to increase after 1 year. The estimated multipliers in a low debt state also show
the same pattern as in the baseline case. The estimated multiplier on impact in a
low debt state is 0.98. It decrease soon after, and the 1-year cumulative multiplier
becomes 0.61. However, it start to increase after 1 year, and the 5-year cumulative
multiplier becomes 1.00. Moreover, the pattern of estimated multiplier in a high
debt state is similar to that in the baseline model.32 The impact multiplier is 4.46,
which is larger than that in a low debt state, but it starts to decrease sharply until 1
year. The 1-year cumulative multiplier in a high debt state is 1.21 and statistically
significant. After 1 year, the multipliers keep decreasing slowly, which is contrary to
those in the linear model and a low debt state in which the cumulative multiplier
start to increase after 1 year. The 5-year cumulative multiplier in a high debt state
31The wide confidence band may not be caused solely by adding tax rate as a control variable. I
re-estimate the equation with the same sample periods (1913 to 2010), but without tax rate. The
confidence band in this case is still wider than that in the baseline case. Thus parts of the wide
confidence band seem to be caused by the observation loss.
32Since the confidence band for the multipliers on impact in a high debt state is wide, I report
the figure with trimmed y axis.
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is 0.30, which is significantly lower than that in a low debt state. Furthermore, the
short-run multipliers in a high debt state are larger than those in a low debt state
as in the baseline model.
In general, the model with the tax rate also gives the same implications as in the
baseline case. The response of government spending, GDP, and debt in a high debt
state are weak, but those in a low debt state and the linear model are strong and
robust. The responses of interest rate are not statistically different across states. In
addition, I do not find strong evidence to support a large increases in distortionary
taxes in a high debt state. Furthermore, the estimate multipliers with the tax rate
show the same implications as in the baseline model: the short-run multipliers in a
high debt state are larger those in a low debt state.
II.5 The Large Short-run Multiplier in a High Debt State: A New Keynesian Lens
The empirical results in this paper reveal that the short-run multipliers in a high debt
state are larger than those in a low debt state, which is contrary to the conventional
prediction. What drives those results? One possible candidate is the interaction
between spending reversals and monetary policy suggested by Corsetti et al. [2012a].
Corsetti et al. [2012a] demonstrate that short-run multipliers in the case with
spending reversals could be larger than those in the case without spending reversals
using a calibrated New Keynesian model. Their model reveals that future spending
cuts in response to a rise in debt could reduce future inflation and, via the monetary
authority’s reaction function, future real interest rate. Since households anticipate
real interest rate below the trend in the future, they increase their current consump-
tion through the intertemporal substitution mechanism, and that magnifies short-run
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stimulus effects of government spending.33 In the empirical analysis, spending rever-
sals are observed only in a high debt state. Thus it is possible to conjecture that
those spending reversals magnify short-run stimulus effects of spending in a high
debt state.
Although Corsetti et al. [2012a] provide a potential theoretical framework to
understand the large short-run multipliers in a high debt state, they do not explicitly
consider the state-dependent effects of debt on government spending such as a state-
dependent spending rule. Here, I construct a new Keynesian model incorporated a
state-dependent government spending rule to evaluate the effects of debt levels on
government spending. The model is based on the parsimonious model in Corsetti
et al. [2012a] except the government spending rule and the defense news process. The
government spending rule is assumed state-dependent based on the empirical finding.
Specifically, spending reversals take place more strongly when the debt-to-GDP ratio
exceeds some threshold.
II.5.1 The Model
The structure of the model is simple and close to the standard New Keynesian
model. The economy consists of three types of agents: households, firms, and the
government.
33Forni and Pisani [2010], and Cimadomo et al. [2011] provide some empirical evidence to support
this view. Forni and Pisani [2010] show that the short-run multipliers become larger in the presence
of spending reversals using a estimated DSGE model. Cimadomo et al. [2011] also show that an
exogenous increasing in government spending with anticipated future spending cuts generates larger
expansionary effects on the economy in short-run comparing to an increase in spending without
anticipated future spending cuts using a VAR model and the US real-time data.
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II.5.1.1 Households
A representative household maximizes her life-time utility subject to the budget
constraint. The life-time utility is given by
Et
∞∑
i=0
βi
(
C1−σt+i
1− σ −
H1+φt+i
1 + φ
)
(4)
where Ct is consumption in time t, and Ht is labor supply. 0 < β < 1 is the discount
factor, σ > 0 is the relative risk-aversion coefficient, and φ > 0 is the inverse Frisch
elasticity of labor supply. The period-by-period budget constraint is as follows:
PtCt + At = WtHt +Rt−1At−1 + Γt − PtTt (5)
Pt is the price index of the consumption good, At are the one-period nominal do-
mestic government bonds, and Rt is the corresponding gross nominal interest rate.
Moreover, Wt is the nominal wage, Γt is the profits from intermediate good firms,
and Tt is the real lump-sum transfers. The representative household chooses labor
supply, consumption, and quantity of government bonds to maximize her life time
utility. The optimality condition for labor supply is given by
Hφt
C−σt
=
Wt
Pt
(6)
Also, the optimality condition for the intertemporal choice is given by
C−σt = βEt
[
C−σt+1
Pt
Pt+1
Rt
]
(7)
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II.5.1.2 Firms
There are two kinds of firms: the final good firm and the intermediate good firm. The
final good Y is a composite of intermediate goods which are produced by a continuum
of monopolistic competitive intermediate good firms. The final good firms operate
in perfect competitive markets and try to minimize their expenditures subject to the
following aggregation technology.
Yt =
[∫ 1
0
Yt(j)
−1
 dj
] 
−1
(8)
where Yt(j) is a intermediate good produced by jth intermediate good firm.  mea-
sures the price elasticity of intermediate goods. The expenditure minimization im-
plies that the associated price indexes of Yt is
Pt =
(∫ 1
0
Pt(j)
1−dj
) 1
1−
(9)
Also, there is a continuum of intermediate good firms [0, 1] which could access
the following production technology
Yt(j) = Ht(j)
1−α (10)
where Yt(j) is the output of jth firm, Ht(j) is the labor demand of jth firm, and
0 ≤ α < 1. Firms are operated in a imperfect competitive market, and each firm
sets its own price with Calvo fashion. Thus, the profit maximizing problem of jth
firm is as follows:
max
Pt(j)
Et
∞∑
i=0
ξiEtΛt,t+iYt+i(j)[Pt(j)− Pt+iMCt+i(j)] (11)
30
where 1− ξ is the probability of price adjusting, Λ is the stochastic discount factor
of the representative household, and MC is the real marginal cost. The optimality
condition for each intermediate good firm is given by
Et
∞∑
i=0
ξiΛt,t+iYt+i(j)
[
Pt(j)− 
− 1Pt+iMCt+i(j)
]
= 0 (12)
The real marginal cost is the same across firms and is given by
MCt =
Wt
Pt
1
(1− α)H−αt
(13)
II.5.1.3 The Government
The monetary authority adjusts nominal interest rate Rt with the following simple
Taylor-rule.
Rt = RΠ
φpi
t (14)
where R is the steady state gross nominal interest rate, and Πt = Pt/Pt−1 is the
inflation at time t. The period-by-period budget constraint of the government is
given by
Dt = Rt−1Dt−1 + PtGt − PtTt (15)
where Dt is nominal government debt, and Gt is real government spending.
The defense news, news, is assumed to be
newst = news+ ζt (16)
news indicates the steady-state level of the defense news. Without loss of generality,
the steady state value of news is assumed zero. The government spending rule is
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assumed to be the following:
Gt = (1−
j∑
i=1
ψiggG) +
j∑
i=1
ψiggGt−i + It−1
(
ψHgnews(newst − news)− ψHgd(dt−1 − d)
)
+ (1− It−1)
(
ψLgnews(newst − news)− ψLgd(dt−1 − d)
)
+ δt (17)
where G is the steady state government spending, dt is the real government debt at
time t, d is the steady state real government debt, and Y is the steady state output.
Thus dt/Y could be interpreted as the debt-to-GDP ratio at time t. ψ
i
gg captures
the persistence of government spending. I is an indicator function, which is defined
by
It =
 1 if dt/Y >threshold0 Otherwise (18)
Thus, I has the value one when the debt-to-GDP ratio exceeds a threshold. ψHgnews
and ψLgnews capture the contemporaneous response of government spending to the
defense news in a high debt state and in a low debt state, respectively. I assume that
ψLgnews ≥ ψHgnews > 0 to capture the strong contemporaneous response of spending
to a shock in a low debt state. Moreover, ψHgd and ψ
L
gd captures the response of
spending to debt in a high debt state and in a low debt state, respectively. Based
on the empirical finding, I assume that ψHgnews > ψ
L
gnews ≥ 0. δ is an exogenous
part of government spending. Moreover, the adjustment process of lump-sum tax is
assumed to be
Tt = T + ψtd(dt−1 − d) (19)
where T is the steady state lump-sum transfers. ψtd > 0 captures the responsiveness
of lump-sum tax to government debt, which is similar to Corsetti et al. [2012a].
32
II.5.1.4 Equilibrium
The labor market clearing condition is given by
Ht =
∫ 1
0
Ht(j)dj (20)
In the equilibrium, the supply and the demand of each intermediate good firm should
be matched and the following aggregate condition is satisfied.
Yt = Ct +Gt (21)
Finally, the asset market clearing condition is as follows.
At = Dt (22)
II.5.2 Calibration
This section provides the calibration for the numerical study. Table 3 summarizes
calibration for the simulation study. The discount factor β, the risk aversion coeffi-
cient σ, and the inverse Frisch elasticity φ are standard and similar to those in the
real business cycle literature. The price stickiness parameter ξ is set to be 0.8 to
match with the five quarters average price duration. Also, I assume that the price
elasticity  is equal to 11 to match 10% of the steady state mark up. The labor share
1− α is equal to 0.7, which is similar to Corsetti et al. [2012a].
For the policy block, I use the following assumptions. To capture the persistent
and hump-shaped response of government spending to a defense news shock, I as-
sume that the government spending rule depends on 3 lags, which is the same as in
Ramey [2011a]. The persistence of government spending ψ1gg, ψ
2
gg, ψ
3
gg are set 1.32,
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−0.18, and −0.2, respectively, based on my estimation. To do this calibration, I es-
timate AR(3) model with the full sample government spending data. The numbers
are also close to those in Ramey [2011a]. To capture the state-dependent respon-
siveness of spending to debt, I assume that the responsiveness of spending to debt
in a high debt state ψHgd is 0.02 and that in a low debt state, ψ
L
gd is 0. Therefore,
government spending responds to debt only in a high debt state in the numerical
study. Furthermore, I assumed that the contemporaneous response of government
spending to the defense news in a high debt state is 0.01 and that in a low debt state
is 0.08 based on the baseline estimation result. The contemporaneous response of
government spending to an increase in the defense news by 1% of GDP in a high
debt state is 0.01%, and that in a low debt state is 0.08% in the baseline estimation.
Additionally, the responsiveness of the lump-sum tax to debt ψtd is assumed to be
0.02, which is the same as in Corsetti et al. [2012a]. The coefficient for the Taylor
rule φpi is set to be 1.5, which is fairy standard.
In addition, the steady state share of government spending to output is assumed
20% to match with the post WWII US time series data. The threshold value of the
debt-to-GDP ratio is set 45%, which is the same as in the baseline estimation. I will
discuss the steady state debt-to-GDP ratio in the next section.
II.5.3 The Impulse Response Analysis
It is not easy to solve the model using the usual log-linear approximation and the
fully stochastic environment because the government spending rule is assumed state-
dependent. To deal with this nonlinearity, I simulate the calibrated model under the
perfect foresight assumption following Corsetti et al. [2013], and Michaillat [2014].34
34With this assumption, we can deal with nonlinear equations directly. Heer and Maussner
[2009] provide detailed discussion.
34
Specifically, I assume that the economy is in the steady state at time 0. At time 1, a
defense new shock hits the economy and no shock occurs after that. In the empirical
analysis, furthermore, each state is defined by the initial level of debt. To capture
this situation, I assume that the steady state debt-to-GDP ratio in a low debt state
is assumed 23%, which is the sample average of the debt-to-GDP ratio in a low debt
state. Similarly, the steady state debt-to-GDP ratio in a high debt state is assumed
68%.35 Figure 9 shows selected impulse responses to an increase in the defense news
by 1% of output in two states. Note that the economy always stays in its initial state
in this simulation because the debt-to-GDP ratio never exceeds the threshold when
the economy starts in a low debt state and the debt-to-GDP never falls below the
threshold when the economy starts in a high debt state.36
The responses of government spending, output, and debt are qualitatively similar
to the empirical results. The response of government spending in a high debt economy
is weak and turns negative at some point, whereas that in a low debt state is strong
and positive. Debt has a weak response in a high debt state, but that has a strong
response in a low debt state. Furthermore, the response of output in a high state
turns negative at some point, which is also matched to the empirical results, at least,
qualitatively.
The notable difference between two states is the response of consumption. In
a low debt state, the response of consumption is negative, but that in a high debt
state is positive. In a low debt state, government spending always has a positive
response since it never responds to debt. Since firms increase their price in response
to an increase in aggregate demand, the response of inflation is positive and, via the
35This assumption implies that the economy reverts to the initial state after the effects of a
temporary increase in government spending disappears.
36This situation is consistent with the empirical analysis since figure 1 shows that the average
duration of each state is not short and transitions between two states rarely happen.
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monetary policy reaction function, real interest rate increases in a low debt economy.
Therefore households reduce their consumption in response to a rise in real interest
rate, which limits short-run stimulus effects. The 1-year cumulative multiplier in a
low debt economy is around 0.5. Since government spending systematically responds
to debt in a high debt state, however, the response of spending turns negative at
some point. That negative response reduces aggregate demand and therefore firms
decrease their price in response to a decrease in aggregate demand. Consequently, the
response of inflation turns negative, and real interest rate decreases. Thus households
increase their current consumption through the intertemporal substitution mecha-
nism and that magnifies short-run stimulus effects. As a result, the 1-year cumulative
multiplier in a high debt economy is 1.2, which is larger than 1 as well as that in a
low debt economy. This simple model suggests that a state-dependent government
spending rule in which spending reversals take place more strongly or abruptly when
the debt-to-GDP ratio exceeds some threshold may be useful to understand the large
short-run multipliers in a high debt state.37
It is worth noting that the large short-run multipliers in a high debt economy is
mainly due to the responsiveness of spending to debt, not due to the high level of debt
itself or the small contemporaneous response of spending to a defense news shock.
The large short-run multipliers in a high debt economy are caused by spending cuts
below trend due to the negative feedback from debt to spending. However, the high
debt-to-output ratio itself and the small contemporaneous response of spending to a
shock cannot lead those spending cuts.38
37Note that the responses of interest rate in the empirical model are not different across states.
However, I use 10-year government bond interest rate to test interest rate nonlinearity due to
sovereign default risks in the empirical analysis, which is not closely related to monetary policy.
38The high level of steady state debt means that debt service costs are large relative to the case
with the low level of debt. The government should issue more debt to pay larger debt service costs
in a high debt economy, so that the response of debt to a shock in a high debt state is stronger
than that in a low debt economy. However, the quantitative effects of debt service costs are small.
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Although this exercise shows how the state-dependent government spending rule
alters spending multipliers, we cannot observe the transition between two states. To
see the transition behavior, I conduct another numerical exercise. In the exercise,
the steady state debt-to-GDP ratio is assumed 44%, which implies that the economy
starts in a low debt state. Under the assumption, the debt-to-GDP ratio exceeds
the threshold around 10 quarters after an increase in the defense news by 1% of
output. Figure 10 shows the result. I also report the case with the linear spending
rule in which government spending does not respond to debt to see the nonlinear
effect clearly. Solid lines indicate that the responses of the variables with the linear
government spending rule, and dashed lines indicate that the response of the variables
with the nonlinear government spending rule.
In the nonlinear case, government spending responds to debt around 10 quarter
so that future spending cuts take place. Since households anticipate future spending
cuts and lower future interest rate, they increase current consumption. However,
since government spending never responds to debt in the linear case, an increase in
government spending crowds out households consumption through the interest rate
channel. As a consequence, the short-run response of output in the nonlinear cases is
much larger than that in the linear case. The estimated 1-year cumulative multipliers
in the nonlinear case is 0.9, and that in the linear case is 0.5.
II.6 Concluding Remarks
This chapter examines the state-dependent effects of government debt on govern-
ment spending multipliers using state-dependent impulse responses drawn by the
Furthermore, the small contemporaneous response of spending to a shock in a high debt economy
is not related to the positive response of consumption. In this simulation, ψgnews works only as a
scale factor. Furthermore, the wealth effective is another potential candidate to explain the large
short-run multipliers in a high debt state since tax burden is reduced in the presence of future
spending cuts.
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two-states local projection method, US historical data, and a government spending
shock identified by the defense news variable constructed by Ramey [2012], and up-
dated by Owyang et al. [2013]. For the estimation, a new quarterly historical US
government debt data from 1890.Q1 to 2010.Q4 is constructed. The empirical results
reveal that the spending multipliers in a high debt state are larger those in a low
debt state, at least, in short-run, which is contrary to the conventional prediction.
To provide a possible channel to understand the result, I construct a simple New
Keynesian model. The simple model suggests that spending reversals and the inter-
action between those spending reversals and monetary policy in a high debt state
could be a potential channel to understand the large short-run multipliers in a high
debt state. The empirical and theoretical results may imply that the short-run stim-
ulus effects of government spending depends not only on current spending but also
on future spending plans. Thus, it is important to manage households expectation
of future spending plans for the performance of a fiscal stimulus package as well as
fiscal consolidation.
This research could be extended in several directions. First, it is important
to construct other historical macroeconomic data and to investigate transmission
channels of government spending. Particularly, the simple theory suggests that the
responses of consumption and real interest rate may significantly differ by the level
of debt. Thus it is worth constructing historical household consumption and real
interest data and investigating how responses of those variables to a spending shock
depend on the level of debt. Second, a rigorous theoretical model to explain the
empirical results is worth developing. Although the theoretical model that I construct
provides a potential channel to understand the empirical results, the model omits
several important dimensions such as investment dynamics, external sectors, and
other frictions. Moreover, it could be important to introduce nominal interest rate
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zero lower bound and to study the interaction between nonlinear fiscal policy and
monetary policy at the zero lower bound. Furthermore, it is worth conducting a
simulation under the fully stochastic environment to study how the precautionary
motive affects the performance of government spending.
39
CHAPTER III
STRUCTURAL CHANGES? FISCAL POLICY AND TWIN DEFICITS IN A
TIME VARYING STRUCTURAL VAR
III.1 Introduction
Do government budget deficits always lead external deficits? In the aftermath of
the financial crisis and the great recession, many developed and developing countries
suffer from huge budget deficits and external deficits, and a number of countries
face the challenge to reduce budget deficits and external deficits together.39 In fact,
the challenge is closely related to the twin deficit hypothesis: budget deficits cause
external deficits. Despite the hypothesis has important policy implications for recent
economic situations, no clear consensus has been reached regarding the hypothesis.
For example, Monacelli et al. [2010] support the traditional twin deficit hypothesis
in the US, whereas Kim and Roubini [2008] support the opposite in the US, which
means that budget deficits lead trade surpluses, called the twin divergence hypothe-
sis. Furthermore, a large body of literature detects structural changes of the relation
between budget balance and external balance in the US, but previous studies ignore
those structure breaks or focus on the post-Bretton Woods era to avoid the effects of
the exchange rate regime shift. However, it is not sufficient to consider only the post
Bretton Woods periods since some studies such as Mann [2002] suggest that there
are other structural breaks on the relation in early 1990s in the US.40
39For example, the budget balance-to-GDP ratio in US is -9% and the trade balance-to-GDP
ratio is -3.5% in 2010.
40Bilbiie et al. [2008] also show that effects of government spending on the economy has been
changed after 1980s in U.S. due to several reasons, though they do not consider external balance
variables such as trade balances. However, it is natural to think that the effects of spending on
external variable are possibly changed.
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In order to evaluate effects of several structural changes on the relationship be-
tween budget balances and external balances in the US, I estimate a time varying
structural VAR (TVP-VAR) model proposed by Primiceri [2005] using post-World
War II data for the US economy. The estimation results are summarized by the
following four.
The first one is that increasing in government spending leads trade deficits in the
Bretton Woods era generally.
The second one is that in contrast to the results in the Bretton Woods era,
increasing in government spending induces trade surpluses in the post-Bretton Woods
era.
The third one is anomaly in the 1980s. Trade deficits are caused by an increase
in government spending in 1980s in spite of adopting a floating exchange regime in
the US.
Finally, the response of terms-of-trade (defined by the ratio of the export price to
the import price as a proxy of internal relative price) to an increase in government
spending is stable across the periods: Appreciation (increasing in value of real dollar)
after initial small depreciation.
The empirical results 1 and 2 indicate that the traditional twin deficit hypothesis
holds under a fixed exchange regime, but the twin divergence hypothesis holds under
a floating exchange rate regime. The result 3 means that the relationship between
budget balances and trade balances depend not only on exchange rate regimes but
also other factors.
To provide some insights about the empirical results, I construct a new Keynesian
small open economy model incorporated Rule-of-Thumb (ROT) consumers proposed
by Gali et al. [2007b]. The core mechanism to understand the difference across ex-
change rate regimes (results (1) and (2)) could be the response of the monetary
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authority to inflation. In the model, a rise in government spending leads a rise in
aggregate demand, and that puts upward pressures on inflation. Under the floating
exchange rate regime and Taylor rule, real interest rate rises since the monetary au-
thority increases nominal interest rate to respond to inflation, and that crowds out
Ricardian consumers’ consumption. Though ROT consumers’ consumption increases
in response to an increase in spending, total aggregate consumption decreases in the
floating exchange regime. Under the fixed exchange regime, however, the first goal
of the monetary authority is stabilizing nominal exchange rate, and therefore the
monetary authority does not respond to inflation caused by government spending.
Consequently, real interest rate less increases relative to a floating exchange rate
regime case, so that Ricardian consumers less decreases their consumption relative
to a floating exchange rate case. In other words, the response of aggregate con-
sumption in the fixed exchange rate case could be positive in contrast to that in
the floating exchange rate case. Thus trade balances could be deteriorated under
the fixed exchange rate case since the positive response of aggregate demand leads
an increase in import. Furthermore, terms-of-trade is closely related to Ricardian
consumers’ consumption in the model, so that an exogenous change in spending al-
ways leads appreciation of terms-of-trade since consumption of Ricardian consumers
always decreases in response to an exogenous change in government spending.
Additionally, the potential channel to explain anomaly in the 1980s (result 3) is
that slow adjusted tax. When the tax rule is less sensitive to an increase in gov-
ernment spending, it stimulates ROT consumers’ consumption since their disposable
income increases and therefore imports increase and trade balances are deteriorated.
There are a huge number of empirical literature on the relation between budget
deficits and trade deficits. However, those literature provide somewhat mixed evi-
dence. Some studies using single equation approaches such as Roubini [1988] and
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Chinn and Prasad [2003] support the twin deficit hypothesis, but Gruber and Kamin
[2007] provide the evidence to support that the effect of budget deficits on current ac-
count deficits is small and statistically insignificant. Several studies using structural
VAR models also provide different results. For example, Corsetti and Mu¨ller [2006],
Kim and Roubini [2008], Mu¨ller [2008], and Enders et al. [2011] support the twin
divergence hypothesis with US data, whereas Monacelli et al. [2010], Beetsma et al.
[2008], and Ravn et al. [2007] provide the evidences which support the traditional
twin deficit hypothesis.41 Also, there are several literatures which emphasize an im-
portance of different conditions of the economy. Corsetti and Mu¨ller [2006] show the
degree of openness matters. They show that the effects of budget deficit on current
account deficit is limited in less open countries such as US, but in open economy such
as Canada budget deficits tend to lead trade deficit. Country panel data studies such
as Corsetti et al. [2012b], and Ilzetzki et al. [2013] show that the effects of a govern-
ment spending shock on trade balance (or current account) depend on the state of
economy such as exchange rate regimes, and financial market conditions. Especially,
Corsetti et al. [2012b] show that twin deficit is common under a fixed exchange rate
regime, while the opposite occurs under a floating exchange rate regime. Born et al.
[2013b] also show that a nominal exchange rate regime is important to determine the
relationship between fiscal and trade balance with OECD panel data. In addition,
several studies using DSGE model such as Erceg et al. [2005] shows that a rise in
the budget deficit leads trade deficit in the US.
The responses of an international relative price such as terms-of-trade to a fiscal
shock are also mixed. In Corsetti and Mu¨ller [2006], for example, terms-of-trade
depreciates after increasing in budget deficits, whereas Monacelli and Perotti [2008]
and Mu¨ller [2008] show appreciation of terms-of-trade after an exogenous increase in
41Hebous [2011] provides a nice summary on results in several VAR studies.
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government spending.42
However, several literature provide evidence on structural breaks on the relation-
ship between budget deficits and external deficits at least in US, but previous studies
do not consider this problem seriously. For example, Leachman and Francis [2002]
argue that the collapse of Bretton Woods seriously alter the relation between bud-
get balances and external balances. Mann [2002] observes that the relation between
budget and external balance has been changed after the early 1990. Hatemi-j and
Shukur [2002] find a structural break on relationship between budget balance and
external balance in 1989 with some econometrics test and US data. Nevertheless,
most empirical studies do not evaluate the effects of structural breaks. Early stud-
ies ignores effects of structural changes. They pooled the Bretton Woods and the
post-Bretton Woods data and estimate equations. Moreover, recent VAR studies
only focus on the post-Bretton Woods era (the periods after 1973 or 1980) to avoid
effects of structural changes due to the exchange rate regime shift. However, it is
not sufficient to avoid the effects of structural breaks since there seems to be other
structural changes, at least, in the US. In contrast to previous literatures, this re-
search explicitly accounts for the effects of structural breaks using the time varying
structural VAR model.
Also, a number of studies employ time varying structural VAR (TVP-VAR) mod-
els to capture structural changes and time varying relations. In particular, studies on
monetary policy such as Cogley and Sargent [2005] and Primiceri [2005] intensively
utilize TVP-VAR models. In a recent day, Benati and Mumtaz [2007] investigate
the time varying driving force of the US economy with the TVP-VAR model, and
Baumeister and Peersman [2013] study time varying effects of oil shock on the US
42In contrast to term of trade, the response of real exchange rate is consistent across different
VAR studies: depreciation. See Kim and Roubini [2008], Monacelli et al. [2010], and Enders et al.
[2011].
44
economy. Nevertheless, few literatures on fiscal policy employ this method. Kirchner
et al. [2010] use the TVP-VAR and the recursive identification method to investi-
gate time varying effects of government spending shock on the EU economy. Pereira
and Lopes [2010] also use the TVP-VAR and the non-recursive Blanchard and Per-
otti [2002] identification method to identify US tax and government spending shock.
However, none of those literatures considers external balance or international price
variables such as trade balance, terms-of-trade, or real exchange rate. To the best of
my knowledge, Rafiq [2010] is the only one which considers the time varying relation
between budget deficits and current account deficits, but this study only focuses on
the post-Bretton Woods era, so that we can not observe the effects of the exchange
rate regime shift. Thus this research can provide new aspects of time varying effects
of fiscal policy on external variables.
III.2 Data, Econometric Method, and Identifiation
III.2.1 Econometric Method
Consider the following reduced form VAR model.
yt = ct +B1,tyt−1 + · · ·+Bk,tyt−k + ut t = 1, · · ·T (23)
where yt is an n × 1 vector of the endogenous variables, ct is an n × 1 vector of
time varying coefficients related with constant term, Bj,t, j = 1, · · · , k are n × n
vectors of time varying coefficients, ut are unobserved shocks with mean zero and
the variance-covariance matrix Ωt and n is the number of endogenous variables. I
allow not only time varying coefficients but also heteroskedastic innovations following
Primiceri [2005] and Cogley and Sargent [2005] to capture structural changes as well
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as change in underlying stochastic distributions in the model.43 Using a triangular
factorization, the variance-covariance matrix Ωt can be factorized as follows:
AtΩtA
′
t = ΣtΣ
′
t (24)
where At is the lower triangular matrix with ones on main diagonal
44 and Σt is the
diagonal matrix given by
At =

1 0 · · · 0
α21,t 1
. . .
...
...
. . .
. . . 0
αn1,t · · · αnn−1,t 1

,Σt =

σ1,t 0 · · · 0
0 σ2,t
. . .
...
...
. . .
. . . 0
0 · · · 0 σn,t

The equation (23) can be rewritten with the factorization as follows:
yt = ct +B1,tyt−1 + · · ·+Bk,tyt−k + A−1t Σtεt (25)
V ar(εt) = In
where V ar is an variance-covariance matrix and In denotes an n×n identity matrix.
Stacking in a vector Bt all the time varying coefficients in equation (25) leads the
following relation.
yt = X
′
tBt + A
−1
t Σtεt (26)
X ′t = In ⊗ [1, y′t−1, · · · , y′t−k]
43Stock [2001] points out that it is possible to exaggerate the time variation in VAR coefficients
without heteroskedastic innovations.
44Allowing time varying At is crucial for the time varying structural VAR model. It can capture
simultaneous interactions among endogenous variables in contrast to time invariant At. Time
invariant At implies that effects of an innovation of one endogenous variable on other variables are
fixed. See Primiceri [2005].
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where ⊗ is the Kronecker product.
The evolution of the state vector of coefficients Bt, αt the collection of the non-
zero and non-one elements of At(stacked by row) and σt which is the collection of
the diagonal elements of Σt are specified as follows:
Bt = Bt−1 + νt (27)
αt = αt−1 + ζt (28)
log σt = log σt−1 + ηt (29)
Bt and αt follow random walks and σt is assumed to follow geometric random walks.
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All those processes are similar to Primiceri [2005] and Kirchner et al. [2010].
The joint distribution of innovations of εt, Bt, αt and σt is assumed to be joint
normal and its variance-covariance matrix is given by
V = V ar


εt
νt
ζt
ηt


=

In 0 0 0
0 Q 0 0
0 0 S 0
0 0 0 W

(30)
The block diagonal assumption of V is not essential but it has two desired properties.
The first one is reducing the number of parameters to be estimated. Allowing corre-
lations among innovations is easily implemented with small modifications but it gives
an over-parametrization problem. The block diagonal assumption for V prevents ill-
identified parameters. The second advantage is the structural interpretation. If all
45The advantages and disadvantages of (geometric) random walks assumption are well described
in Primiceri [2005] and Kirchner et al. [2010]. The main advantage of random walks is that it
reduces the number of parameters in the estimation process.
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innovations are correlated, it is not easy to identify the meaning of shocks.46
Additionally, S is assumed to be the block diagonal matrix as in Primiceri [2005]
and Baumeister and Peersman [2013].47 The assumption implies that the contem-
poraneous relations among variables evolve independently in each equation. It facil-
itates estimating At row by row, which simplifies the estimation algorithm.
48
III.2.2 Estimation Method
In this section, I briefly describe the estimation algorithm and the choice of the
priors. The main algorithm is based on Primiceri [2005] and Cogley and Sargent
[2005] with minor modifications for the calibration of the priors. Detailed description
of the estimation procedures and the calibration of the priors is left to appendix A.
As mentioned in Primiceri [2005] and Kirchner et al. [2010], Bayesian method with
Gibbs sampling is suitable way to estimate a time varying coefficients model. Gibbs
sampling is conducted by the following four steps.
The first step is for VAR coefficients Bt. Conditional on the data and a history
of At, Σt and hyperparameters, the measurement equation (26) is a standard linear-
Gaussian model. As shown in Carter and Kohn [1994], the VAR coefficients can be
drawn from the Kalman filter and the backward recursion.
46Kirchner et al. [2010] claim that the independence of Ωt and hyperparameters(Q, S and V ) is
reasonable because the innovations of VAR model(ut) capture short-term events such as business
cycles events or policy shocks in contrast to the innovations of parameters(νt, ζt, ηt) which capture
long-term events such as institutional changes. Such short-term events are not necessarily correlated
with long term institutional events.
47The model includes four variables in this paper. Thus the structure of S is given by
S =
 S1 01×2 01×302×1 S2 02×3
03×1 03×2 S3

where S1 = V ar(ζ21,t), S2 = V ar([ζ31,t, ζ32,t]
′), S3 = V ar([ζ41,t, ζ42,t, ζ43,t]′) and 0i×j is the i × j
matrix in which all elements are zero.
48Detailed discussions in appendix A and also in Baumeister and Peersman [2013]
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The second step is for covariance states At. Conditional on the data and a history
of Bt, Σt and V , the measurement equation (26) can be rewritten as Atut = Σtεt
where ut is observable. This is a standard linear-Gaussian system with independent
equations given the lower triangular matrix At and the block diagonal matrix S. The
Kalman filter and the backward recursion can be applied to sample At equation by
equation.
The third steop is volatility states Σt. Conditional on the data and a history of
Bt, At and V , the measurement equation (26) is non-linear and non-Gaussian but
it is easily converted to a linear one by squaring and taking log of each elements.
However, the transformed system is still non-Gaussian, so that it is difficult to use the
standard smoother. Fortunately, the transformed system can be approximated to a
linear-Gaussian system by Kim et al. [1998], which facilitates applying the standard
smoother proposed by Carter and Kohn [1994] to the final approximated system to
draw the elements of Σt.
The fourth stop is for hyperparameters V . Conditional on Bt, At, Σt and the
data, the sampling of the hyperparameter V is standard since each block of V has
an independent inverse-Wishart posterior given the proper priors.
Gibbs sampling with sufficiently large iterations and a long burn-in period delivers
a realization from the joint posterior distribution. In this paper, I generate 100, 000
draws and burn-in the first 50, 000. Of the remaining 50, 000, every 10th draw is kept
to mitigate the autocorrelation of draws similar in Kirchner et al. [2010]. Overall,
Gibbs sampling works well and the chain seems to be well mixed.
The choice of the priors is somewhat standard as in Primiceri [2005], Benati
and Mumtaz [2007] and Koop et al. [2009] but there are minor differences. First,
the selection of degrees of freedom of the priors is more conservative. I allow the
minimum number for the priors to be proper as in Benati and Mumtaz [2007] and
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Kirchner et al. [2010] to minimize effects of the priors. Secondly, in most TVP-
VAR studies, priors are calibrated with OLS estimators of an initial “trained data”
which is then discarded. As opposed to previous studies, I use the full sample OLS
estimators to calibrate the priors following Canova and Ciccarelli [2009]. There are
two reasons to use the full sample method. First, some initial data points(usually 8 to
10 years) should be sacrificed with the trained data method, that is, some data points
of Brettonwoods system are discarded. A short sample of Brettonwoods can mislead
the effects of a fixed exchange rate regime. Furthermore, the full sample method
minimizes the uncertain involved in calibrating the priors properly as mentioned in
Canova and Ciccarelli [2009].49 Details are in appendix A.
Another issue is imposing the stability condition on the VAR coefficients Bt. Since
Gibbs sampling does not guarantee the stability of each draw of Bt(the eigenvalues of
Bt are in the unit circle), Cogley and Sargent [2005] impose the stability condition on
the time varying coefficients. In Cogley and Sargent [2005], the variable of concern
is inflation and the FED conducts monetary policy in a proper way to ruling out
explosively inflation paths. As discussed in Kirchner et al. [2010] and Pereira and
Lopes [2010], however, the fiscal authority is not necessarily concerned about the
stability of the economy unlike the monetary authority. Following their arguments,
I do not impose the stability condition on the VAR coefficients Bt.
III.2.3 Data
The TVP-VAR model consists of four variables of the US economy: log of per capita
real government spending(GOV), log of per capita real GDP(GDP), net export to
49Kirchner et al. [2010] and Rafiq [2012] also use full sample OLS estimators to calibrate their
priors.
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GDP ratio(NX), log of terms-of-trade(TOT).50 The sample starts from 1947.Q1 to
2013.Q2. Government spending and GDP are deflated with GDP deflator and di-
vided by mid-period population. Government spending is the general government
spending which includes the general government’s consumption and investment.51
Net exports is defined by the difference between exports and imports, which means
that negative net exports is equivalent to trade deficit. Terms-of-trade is the ra-
tio of export price to import price, which implies that increasing in terms-of-trade
means appreciation in the value of US dollar measured in real term. All variables
are taken from Bureau of economic analysis (BEA) except terms-of-trade and GDP
deflator taken from FRED in September 2013 and pre-detrended with quadratic time
polynomials to focus on cyclical components following Pereira and Lopes [2010].52
III.2.4 Identification and Interpretation
In the TVP-VAR study, the exogenous government spending shock is identified by
assuming that government spending does not respond to other variables (GDP, NX
and TOT) within a quarter. The identification scheme is widely adopted in VAR
literatures on fiscal policy such as Fata´s and Mihov [2001], Blanchard and Perotti
[2002], Monacelli et al. [2010] and Kirchner et al. [2010].53 This identification strategy
seems reasonable because the government spending series used in this paper does not
include transfers which automatically vary over business cycles. Moreover, lags of
50I include terms-of-trade as a proxy of the relative international price instead of real exchange
rate because the time span of real exchange rate does not cover the sample periods. BIS real
effective exchange rate which is the longest starts the final quarter in 1963. Corsetti and Mu¨ller
[2006] and Mu¨ller [2008] also use terms-of-trade as a proxy of the international relative price. Also,
the variables which I use are similar in Ilzetzki et al. [2013] though they use current account as a
proxy of external balance and real exchange rate instead of terms-of-trade.
51This series does not include either transfers or interest payment.
52For robustness checks, I also estimate the model with the level data. The results are not
sensitive to the detrend method.
53Especially, Kirchner et al. [2010] use this identification method in their TVP-VAR study on
fiscal policy in EU.
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policy decisions can prevent policy makers’ instantaneous responses to the state of the
economy. With the identification scheme, the exogenous government spending shock
is easily identified by ordering government spending first in the system. Specifically,
ut = Ctεt, CtC
′
t = Ωt (31)
where Ct is the mapping between reduced form innovations ut and structural shocks
εt. By definition of At and the identification strategy, Ct = A
−1
t Σt as described in
Primiceri [2005].
It is worth pointing out that this identification strategy is not undebatable.
The narrative approach to identity government spending shocks such as Ramey and
Shapiro [1998] and Ramey [2011a] often yields different results to compare with the
structural VAR approach. For example, the narrative approach tends to predict the
negative response of private consumption and real wages to increasing in government
spending while the structural VAR studies show the opposite. Ramey [2011a] points
out that the identified government spending shocks by the structural VAR approach
are anticipated by the private sector, which leads the difference(or an incorrect im-
pulse response). However, Mertens and Ravn [2010] who develop the new method
which is robust to the anticipation effects show that the anticipation effects are not
a serious problem in practice. They cannot find an evidence to support that the
difference is due to the anticipation effects. Also, Fisher and Peters [2010] build the
new narrative measure using the accumulated excess returns of large US military
contractors and estimate the effects of government spending shocks. The estimation
results are consistent with the results of the structural VAR approach: increasing
in private consumption and real wages(after small initial decline). Furthermore, I
estimate the model including Ramey [2011a]’s new variable to control the anticipa-
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tion effects, and the results show the same implications as in the model without the
news variable. To economize the number of parameters to estimate, I use the model
without the news variables.
Another issue is the choice of the lag length for the econometric model. The
model in this paper includes four lags which is longer than most of TVP-VAR lit-
eratures such as Primiceri [2005], Cogley and Sargent [2005], Benati and Mumtaz
[2007] and Kirchner et al. [2010] which include two lags.54 The choice of an ap-
propriate lag length is important in structural VAR studies on fiscal policy because
the identifying strategy uses the time lag of policy decisions. If the structural VAR
model includes too short lags, it cannot fully capture delayed effects of change in
other macroeconomic variables on government spending.55 Also for richer dynamics,
a sufficient lag-length is important. At the same time, including longer lags in the
TVP-VAR means that the number of parameters to be estimated increases expo-
nentially, which can yield ill-identified parameters. Thus in order to minimize the
over-parametrization and to control the time lag of policy decisions properly, the
lag length is set to be four which is slightly longer than that in other TVP-VAR
literatures.
54Baumeister and Peersman [2013] use four lags in their TVP-VAR study on time-varying effects
of oil shock
55Born and Mu¨ller [2012] provide the evidence on how long the policy decision lag is. They
test whether the restriction on the contemporaneous response of government spending to other
macroeconomic variables is valid or not with econometric methods using US, UK, Canada and
Australia data. They conclude that the restriction can not be rejected even with annual frequency
data, which implies that the lag of policy decisions can be longer than a year. Beetsma et al. [2009]
also have similar results with the data of several countries in EU. Moreover, most of VAR studies
on fiscal policy such as Blanchard and Perotti [2002] and Fata´s and Mihov [2001] include four lags
with quarterly data though they use the traditional time-invariant VAR model.
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III.3 Estimation Results
This section is organized as follows. Section III.3.1 presents the estimation results of
the traditional time invariant structural VAR with two sub-periods as preliminary
evidences on structural breaks between the Bretton Woods and post-Bretton Woods.
Next, section III.3.2 presents the estimation results from the time varying structural
VAR model to investigate the effects of structural breaks more carefully.
III.3.1 Preliminary Evidences on Structural Breaks: Sub-sample Analysis
In order to provide preliminary evidences on structural change between the Bret-
ton Woods and the post-Bretton Woods, the data are divided by two sub-periods:
1947.Q1 - 1972.Q4 and 1980.Q1-2013.Q2 and for each sub-period the time invariant
structural VAR is estimated.56 Figure 11 shows the estimated impulse response to
1% increasing in exogenous government spending for each sub-period. The panels in
the first column show the response in the Bretton Woods era while the panels in the
second column show the response in the post-Bretton Woods era.
In the first row in figure 12, increasing in government spending leads trade deficit
in the Bretton Woods while the opposite occurs in the post-Bretton woods. In the
Bretton Woods, the initial response of trade balance is positive. However, the size
is small and the response turns to negative soon. After 7 quarters, trade balance
drops 0.15 percent points and goes back to the trend. Unlike the Bretton Woods, the
initial reaction of trade balance is negative but turns to positive soon in the post-
56For the time invariant structural VAR, I use the same identification mechanism explained in
section . Additionally, the time invariant VAR includes original four variables (GOV-GDP-NX-
TOT) and two additional variables: budget balance to GDP ratio and 3 month treasury bill rate. I
also include 4 lags, linear and quadratic time trend for the estimation. The 4-variable (GOV-GDP-
NX-TOT) time invariant structural VAR model also delivers similar results. Moreover, increasing
in government spending always leads budget deficit in both periods but budget balance deteriorates
more in the post-Bretton Woods era.
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Bretton Woods. After the peak response in 4th quarter (increasing 0.12 percent
points), trade balance goes back to the trend. This result is matched to Corsetti
et al. [2012b]. They estimate several state-dependent effects of government spending
with OECD panel and show that increasing in government spending leads trade
deficit under a fixed exchange rate regime while the opposite occurs under a floating
exchange rate regime.57
Unlike the response of trade balance, the reaction of terms-of-trade (in the second
row) seems to be similar in both periods: appreciation in short run and depreciation
in long run.58 The initial response of terms-of-trade in Bretton woods is slightly
below zero but turns to positive soon. After the peak response in 6th quarter (0.13%
appreciation), the response starts to decline. The reaction turns to negative after 9th
quarter, terms-of-trade goes back to the trend slowly after 15th quarter. Similarly,
the initial response is negative in the post-Bretton Woods but size is larger than
that in the Bretton Woods. After the peak response in 4th quarter (increased by
0.12%), the response turns to negative after 5th quarter and goes back to the trend
slowly. In general, the basic pattern in the response of terms-of-trade is similar in
both sub-periods but appreciation in terms-of-trade is lager and persistent in the
Bretton Woods.
The panels in the third row show the response of GDP to government spending.
The stimulus effect of government spending is much stronger and more persistent
in the Bretton Woods than that in the post-Bretton Woods. In particular, GDP
responds positively to government spending only in first and second quarter after
the shock in post-Bretton Woods. This result is similar to Perotti [2004] and Bilbiie
57In contrast to Corsetti et al. [2012b], Ilzetzki et al. [2013] and Born et al. [2013b] show that
the response of external balance is not different across nominal exchange rate regimes.
58In Mu¨ller [2008] and Monacelli and Perotti [2008], terms-of-trade appreciates after increasing
in government spending in US though they consider only the post-Bretton Woods era.
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et al. [2008]. Their model also predicts weak and short-lived stimulus effects of
government spending after early 1980s. However, the weak and short-lived stimulus
effects disappear in the TVP-VAR model. Detailed discussion is in section .
Overall, the results of the time invariant structural VAR model indicate that
the twin deficit hypothesis seems to be reasonable in the Bretton Woods while twin
divergence may occur in the post-Bretton Woods, which implies that nominal ex-
change rate regimes have an important role to determine the relation between budget
balance and external balance. Meanwhile, the response of terms-of-trade to govern-
ment sending is not quite different at least qualitatively across nominal exchange
rate regimes.
III.3.2 Unveiling Time Variation: Time Varying Structural VAR
In this section, the estimated time varying impulse response to 1% increasing in
government spending is reported. Figure 13 presents the time profile of the response
of trade balance. The profile shows that the response of trade balance are generally
below zero in the Bretton Woods after mid 1950s but it starts to rise after collapse of
the Bretton Woods (1973) and turns to positive in the mid and late 1970s. However,
the response begins to decrease and turns to negative in the early 1980s. Finally,
the sign of the response is changed to positive after the late 1980s. The time varying
pattern is more clear in Figure 14. The median response of trade balance is negative
in most horizons of the impulse response (the negative peak response is around −0.1
percent point) and reverts back to trend with a small overshooting under a peg
system and in some periods of the 1980s. However, trade surplus (the positive peak
response is around 0.15 percent point) is more common by increasing in government
spending in most periods of the post-Bretton Woods.
To sum up, the time varying pattern of the response of trade balance indicates
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that an unanticipated government spending shock induces trade deficit under a fixed
exchange rate regime generally whereas trade surplus is induced under a flexible
exchange rate regime.59 Those patterns are consistent with the results from the time
invariant structural VAR with sub-samples in section . In addition, the TVP-VAR
model delivers the new finding: the response in the 1980s is abnormal. Despite a
flexible exchange rate regime is adopted in this period, trade deficit is caused by
positive government spending shock.
The response of terms-of-trade is stable across the year: appreciation after initial
small depreciation. Figure 14 and 15 clearly show that the response of terms-of-trade
is negative initially (except some periods in the early 1950s and the mid 2000s), but
it turns to positive soon and reverts back to the tread very slowly. This pattern
is also similar to the time invariant VAR results. The size of initial depreciation is
between 0.1% and 0.2% in most periods and the size of maximum appreciation rate
is around 0.5% in several periods.
Figure 16 and 17 present the time profile of the response of GDP to government
spending. The size of the initial response is almost the same in every period, which is
in line with Pereira and Lopes [2010]. The contemporaneous response of GDP to 1%
increasing in government spending is around 0.14%. Taking into account the average
government spending share to GDP(20%), the government spending multipliers is
around 0.7 on impact.60 Unlike the time invariant VAR evidence, however, the
stimulus effects are not less persistent after the early 1980s. The evidence from
the TVP-VAR indicates that the response of GDP stays below zero longer in only
59Note that the positive response of trade balance before mid 1950s can be caused by the
war(World War II) effects. The recovery of Europe and Japan started in 1950s. Thus before
mid 1950s, US is a dominant industrial country and the pattern of US trade balance is distorted
by the effects of the war. See Branson et al. [1980]. I focus on the period after the mid 1950s in
this paper.
60In Hall [2009], the evidence from VAR studies finds the output multiplier is between 0.5 and
1.
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some periods of the 1980s. Figure 15 shows that the response of GDP turns to
negative after 5 or 6 quarters and then reverts back to trend after 3 years in most
periods. However, the response still stays negative region after 3 years in the 1980s.
Also, figure 16 shows that the negative peak response of GDP is around -0.1 in
the 1980s which is smaller than that in other periods. Pereira and Lopes [2010]
also find that stimulus effects of government expenditure do not vary so much over
time in their TVP-VAR study. They argue that rolling sample estimations may
exaggerate the actual drift, especially the effects of spending shock, because of lack
of the smoothing process. VAR models with sub-samples are also sensitive to choice
of sub-periods. Thus earlier studies such as Perotti [2004] and Bilbiie et al. [2008]
possibly overestimate the instability of effects of government expenditure.
Figure 18 and 19 report the response of government spending shock to government
spending shock. After the early 1980s, the response of government spending increases
slightly more than that in earlier periods but the response of government spending
is somewhat stable across the time.
III.4 Discussion
From the results of the TVP-VAR and the time invariant structural VAR in section
III.3, the following four empirical facts about the behavior of trade balance and
terms-of-trade are obtained.
The first one is that increasing in government spending leads trade deficits in the
Bretton Woods era generally.
The second one is that in contrast to the results in the Bretton Woods era,
increasing in government spending induces trade surpluses in the post-Bretton Woods
era.
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The third one is anomaly in the 1980s. Trade deficits are caused by an increase
in government spending in 1980s in spite of adopting a floating exchange regime in
the US.
Finally, the response of terms-of-trade (defined by the ratio of the export price to
the import price as a proxy of internal relative price) to an increase in government
spending is stable across the periods: Appreciation (increasing in value of real dollar)
after initial small depreciation.
In order to provide potential explanations for the empirical findings, I construct
the new Keynesian small open economy based on Corsetti et al. [2009] and Corsetti
et al. [2011]. In section III.4.1, and III.4.2, I explain the theoretical model. In section
III.4.3, I examine the effects of change in a nominal exchange regime on trade balance
and terms-of-trade and provide some structural explanations. In section III.4.4, I
investigate the effects of slow adjustment of tax and spending reversal to provide
potential channels to understand the mysterious twin deficits in the 1980s.
III.4.1 Theoretical Model
The model is based on the small open economy new Keynesian model with govern-
ment spending proposed by Corsetti et al. [2009] and Corsetti et al. [2011].
III.4.1.1 Households
There is a continuum of households [0, 1] which consists of two types of agents: Asset
holders and non-asset holders. Asset holders (1−λ fraction of households) trade the
one-period domestic bonds and the international bonds given their price. While
non-asset holders (λ fraction of households) do not participate in either domestic or
international bond markets. This assumption is similar to Gali et al. [2007b] and
Bilbiie et al. [2008].
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A representative asset holder, indexed with a subscript A, maximizes her life-time
utility subject to the budget constraint. The life-time utility is given by
Et
∞∑
i=0
βi
(
C1−γA,t+i
1− γ −
H1+φA,t+i
1 + φ
)
(32)
where CA,t is consumption in time t and HA,t is labor supply. β is the discount factor
of the representative asset holder, γ > 0 is the relative risk-aversion coefficient and
φ > 0 is the inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply. The period-by-period budget
constraint is as follows:
PtCA,t +R
−1
t At+1 +R
−1
F,t
Bt+1
εt
= WtHA,t + At +
Bt
εt
+ Γt − Tt (33)
Pt is the corresponding price index to the consumption good, At are the one-period
nominal domestic government bonds and Rt is the corresponding gross nominal inter-
est rate. Bt are the one-period nominal international bonds, RF,t is the corresponding
gross nominal interest rate and εt is the nominal exchange rate measured in units of
foreign currency per domestic currency. Moreover, Wt is the nominal wage, Γt is the
profits from intermediate good firms and Tt is the nominal lump-sum transfers. It is
assumed that domestic bonds are not traded in international financial markets as in
standard small open economy model such as Gertler et al. [2007]. Since I assumed
the imperfect international financial market, a closing technique is needed to ensure
stationarity of the model. Following Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe [2003] and Kollmann
[2002], I assumed that RF,t depends on the aggregate level of foreign bonds:
RF,t = R
∗
t − χ
Bt+1
εtPtYt
(34)
χ is the debt-elasticity of interest rate, R∗t is the gross world nominal interest rate
60
and Yt is the real GDP. The representative asset holder chooses labor supply, con-
sumption, quantity of domestic and international bonds to maximize her life time
utility. The optimality condition for labor supply is given by
Wt
Pt
=
HφA,t
C−γA,t
(35)
Also, the optimality conditions for intertemporal choices (consumption, domestic
and international bonds) are given by
C−γA,t = βEt
[
C−γA,t+1Rt
Pt
Pt+1
]
(36)
C−γA,t = βEt
[
C−γA,t+1RF,t
εt
εt+1
Pt
Pt+1
]
(37)
The objective of a representative non-asset holder, indexed with a subscript N ,
is maximizing her instantaneous utility which is given by
C1−γN,t
1− γ −
H1+φN,t
1 + φ
(38)
where CN,t is consumption and HN,t is labor supply. Since the representative non-
asset holder does not trade bonds and does not have shares of intermediate good
firms, her consumption is equal to the disposable income which is the labor income,
WtHN,t, less the lump-sum taxes, Tt.
PtCN,t = WtHN,t − Tt (39)
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III.4.1.2 Final Good Firms
The final consumption good Ct is a composite of domestic intermediate goods and
foreign intermeidate goods which are produced by a continuum of monopolistic com-
petitive domestic firms and foreign firms, respectively. The final good firms operate
in perfect competitive markets and try to minimize their expenditures subject to the
following aggregation technology.
Ct =
[
(1− ω) 1σ
([∫ 1
0
YD,t(j)
−1
 dj
] 
−1
)σ−1
σ
+ ω
1
σ
([∫ 1
0
YF,t(j)
−1
 dj
] 
−1
)σ−1
σ
] σ
σ−1
(40)
where YD,t(j) is a domestic intermediate good produced by jth domestic intermediate
good firm and YF,t(j) is a foreign good produced by jth foreign intermediate good
firm. ω is the proportion of foreign goods in composite good, which can be interpreted
as the degree of openness. σ measures the trade price elasticity and  measures the
price elasticity of intermediate goods within the same country. Let me define the
domestic composite good YD,t and the foreign composite good YF,t as follows:
YD,t =
[∫ 1
0
YD,t(j)
−1
 dj
] 
−1
, YF,t =
[∫ 1
0
YF,t(j)
−1
 dj
] 
−1
(41)
Then expenditure minimization implies that the associated price indexes of YD,t and
YF,t are
PD,t =
(∫ 1
0
PD,t(j)
1−dj
) 1
1−
, PF,t =
(∫ 1
0
PF,t(j)
1−dj
) 1
1−
(42)
The price index of import goods is given by
PF,t =
P ∗t
εt
(43)
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where P ∗t is the foreign aggregate price index. By the similar process, the domestic
aggregate price index Pt is
Pt = [(1− ω)P 1−σD,t + ωP 1−σF,t ]
1
1−σ (44)
III.4.1.3 Intermediate Good Firms
There is a continuum of domestic intermediate good firms [0, 1] which use the fol-
lowing production technology
YD,t(j) = Ht(j) (45)
where YD,t(j) is the output of jth firm and Ht(j) is the labor demand of jth firm.
Intermediate good sector is assumed to be imperfect competitive and each firm sets
its own price with Calvo fashion. Thus the profit maximizing problem of jth firm is
as follows:
maxEt
∞∑
i=0
ξiΛt,t+i[YD,t,t+i(j)PD,t(j)−Wt+iHt+i(j)] (46)
where 1−ξ is the probability of price adjusting and Λt is the stochastic discount factor
of the representative asset holder. The optimality condition for each intermediate
good firm is given by
Et
∞∑
i=0
ξiΛt,t+i
[
YD,t,t+i(j)PD,t(j)− 
− 1Wt+iHt+i
]
= 0 (47)
Finally, it is assumed that the foreign country has the isomorphic aggregation tech-
nology and the law of one price holds at the level of intermediate goods in this model
as in Gertler et al. [2007] and Corsetti et al. [2011].
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III.4.1.4 The Government
The monetary authority adjusts the nominal interest Rt with the following Taylor-
rule under a flexible exchange rate regime.
Rt = R + φpi(Πt − Π) (48)
where R is the steady-state nominal interest rate, Πt = Pt/Pt−1 is the CPI inflation
and Π is the steady-state inflation rate. On the other hands, the monetary authority
keeps the change in nominal exchange rate zero under a fixed exchange rate regime,
which means that the monetary authority follows the rule given by
∆εt = εt − εt−1 = 0 (49)
Government spending Gt is defined by the aggregation of domestic intermediate
goods:
Gt =
(∫ 1
0
YD,t(j)
−1
 dj
) 
−1
(50)
By the cost minimization, the associated price index of government spending is PD,t.
I assumed that government spending is financed by lump-sum taxes Tt or the one-
period government bonds Dt. Given this assumption, the period-by-period budget
constraint of the government is given by
R−1t Dt+1 = Dt + PD,tGt − Tt (51)
Additionally, it is assumed that government spending follows
Gt = (1− ψgg)G+ ψggGt−1 + ψgd Dt
Pt−1
+ ηt (52)
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0 ≤ ψgg ≤ 1 captures the persistence of government spending, ψgd ≤ 0 means the de-
gree of responsiveness of government spending to real government debts and ηt is an
exogenous shock of government spending. If ψgd is equal to zero, government spend-
ing follows a simple AR(1) process and does not respond to the level of government
debts(no spending reversal).
The adjustment process of tax is assumed to be
TR,t = (1− ψtg)G+ ψtgGt + ψtd Dt
Pt−1
(53)
where TR,t = Tt/Pt is real taxes. 0 ≤ ψtg ≤ 1 captures the responsiveness of tax
to the government spending and ψtd ≥ 0 captures the responsiveness of tax to the
level of government debts. If ψtg is equal to one, taxes should increase one-for-
one to increasing in government spending. The government spending rule and tax
adjustment rule are similar to Corsetti et al. [2011] and Corsetti et al. [2012a].
III.4.1.5 Equiibrium
In equilibrium, the supply and the demand of each domestic intermediate good firm
should be matched. Given households’ and government’s demands of domestic goods
and the volume of exports, the following equation must be satisfied.
YD,t(j) =
(
PD,t(j)
PD,t
)−(
(1− ω)
(
PD,t
Pt
)−σ
Ct + ω
(
P ∗D,t
P ∗t
)−σ
C∗t +Gt
)
(54)
where P ∗D,t is the price index of domestic goods in terms of the foreign currency and
C∗t is the foreign consumption index. Let the aggregate output index Yt be
Yt =
(∫ 1
0
YD,t(j)
−1
 dj
) 
−1
(55)
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Using the firm level equilibrium condition and the aggregate output index, the fol-
lowing aggregate relation should hold.
Yt = (1− ω)
(
PD,t
Pt
)−σ
Ct + ω
(
P ∗D,t
P ∗t
)−σ
C∗t +Gt (56)
Moreover, the following aggregate consumption relation and the labor market clear-
ing condition should be hold.
Ct = λCN,t + (1− λ)CA,t, Ht = λHN,t + (1− λ)HA,t (57)
Given the assumption that domestic bonds are not traded in international financial
markets, the domestic asset market clearing condition is as follows:
(1− λ)At = Dt (58)
The terms-of-trade St which is the ratio of export price to import price and real
exchange rate Qt can be defined
St =
PD,t
PF,t
, Qt =
Ptεt
P ∗t
(59)
Following the definition of the real exchange rate and terms-of-trade, increasing in Qt
and St means appreciation of the real exchange rate and terms-of-trade(appreciation
in domestic currency measured in real term). Finally, trade balance in terms of
steady state output is as follows:
TBt =
1
Y
(
Yt − Pt
PD,t
Ct −Gt
)
(60)
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III.4.2 Calibration
Table 6 summarizes the calibration for the simulation study. The discount factor β,
the risk aversion coefficient γ and the inverse Frisch elasticity φ are standard. Trade
price elasticity σ is assumed to be 0.7 in line with Monacelli et al. [2010] and Born
et al. [2013b].61 The price stickiness parameter ξ is set to be 0.75 to match with the
four quarters average price duration. This number is in line with several literatures
such as Gali and Monacelli [2005].
Also, I assume that  is equal to 11 to match 10% of the steady state mark
up. Taylor coefficient φpi is set to be 1.5 which is standard and ensures the rational
equilibrium. Following Corsetti et al. [2009], I assume the debt-elasticity of interest
rate χ is 0.00001 which is also similar to Gertler et al. [2007]. For the fraction of
non-asset holders λ, I assume 1/3 for the baseline simulation. Corsetti et al. [2012a]
also use the same number and Bilbiie et al. [2008] estimate λ close to 1/3 with 1983
to 2004 US data. Additionally, in order to examine the role of non asset holders in
section III.4.4, I use a different number 1/2 for λ and compare with those two results.
The persistence of government spending ψgg is set to be 0.9 which is standard. For
the simplicity, I assume that the government spending rule is not sensitive to level
of debts (ψgd = 0) for the baseline simulation. Moreover, for the baseline simulation,
the debt-responsiveness for tax ψtd is assumed to be 0.02 which is in line with Corsetti
et al. [2011] and the responsiveness of government spending for tax ψtg is 0.5 which
is the same in Corsetti et al. [2009]. To study the effects of slow-adjusting taxes in
section III.4.4, I also use a different number 0 for ψtg. The steady state share of
61There is no consensus about this parameter. Backus and Smith [1993] use 1.5 for their simu-
lation while Born et al. [2013b] use 1/3 for the quantitative results. Monacelli et al. [2010] shows
that the response of trade balance to government spending shock heavily depends on this param-
eter value. To match with the empirical results, I choose relatively small number 0.7. Detailed
discussion in Monacelli et al. [2010].
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government spending to output is assumed to be 20% and the import share ω is set
to be 0.2 to match with US time series data.
Finally, for the simulation, the model is linearized around the zero government
debt and zero inflation steady state. All foreign variables are assumed to be constant.
III.4.3 Floating Exchange Rate Regime versus Fixed Exchange Rate Regime
In this section, I examine the effects of change in a nominal exchange rate regime on
trade balance and terms-of-trade. Quantitative results are measured in deviations
from the steady state scaled by the steady state output except terms-of-trade and
inflation. For the impulse response of terms-of-trade and inflation, the results are
measured in percentage deviations from the steady state.
The second panel in the first row in figure 20 shows that the response of trade
balance to increasing in government spending by 1% of output. Under a floating
exchange rate regime, trade surplus is caused by exogenous government spending
shock whereas trade deficit results from exogenous government spending shock under
a fixed exchange rate regime. Those results are consistent with the empirical results,
at least qualitatively. What drives those results? As discussed in Monacelli et al.
[2010], two different effects determine the sign of net exports in the standard small
open economy new Keynesian model: the absorption effect and the switching effect.
The former is generated by the response of the monetary authority to inflation. The
monetary authority tends to increase nominal interest rate since inflation is boosted
by exogenous government spending shock. Intuitively, real interest rate is increasing
when nominal interest rate is increasing since the Taylor coefficient is greater than
1 and the Fisher relation holds in the standard model. Suppose all consumers are
asset holders (λ = 0), aggregate consumption decreases since real interest increases,
so that imports decline also. As a result, trade balance improves by the absorption
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effect.
On the other hand, exogenous government spending shock makes terms-of-trade
appreciate, which means that the price of a domestic good to a foreign good becomes
expensive and households increase consumption of foreign goods. As a result, trade
balance worsens by the switching effect. Monacelli et al. [2010] shows that if the
trade price elasticity σ is less than one with the log utility function, the absorption
effect dominates the switching effect. However, if σ is greater than one, the opposite
result is generated.
In this model, government spending shock crowds out asset holders’ consump-
tion and makes terms-of-trade appreciates by the similar procedure described above.
Specifically, asset holders’ consumption dynamics is determined by the following
equation under a floating exchange rate regime similar to Corsetti et al. [2011].
cA,t = −1
γ
∞∑
i=0
(rt+i − pit+1+i) = −1
γ
∞∑
i=0
(φpipit+i − pit+1+i) (61)
where lower case letters mean percentage deviations from the steady state and the
last equality comes from the Taylor rule.62 This equation shows that asset holders’
consumption depends on the current and entire future inflation path. Because of
the positive response of inflation (the first panel in the third row in figure 20) and
nominal interest rate to government spending shock, consumption of asset holders
decreases. The first panel in the second row in figure 19 shows that result. At the
same time, government spending shock boosts output, so that disposable income of
non-asset holders increases. Therefore consumption of non-asset holders increases as
in Gali et al. [2007b]. The second panel in the second row in figure shows increas-
ing in consumption of non-asset holders. However, given the fraction of non-asset
62The last equality holds only under a floating exchange rate regime. However, the first equality
always holds regardless of a nominal exchange rate regime.
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holders(1/3), increasing in non-asset holders’ consumption is not enough to cover
decreasing in asset holder’s consumption therefore aggregate consumption decreases
(the final panel in the second row in figure 19). As a consequence, trade balance can
be improved by the absorption effect.
Furthermore, from the asset holders’ optimality condition, the definition of terms-
of-trade and real exchange rate, the following equation can be obtained.
Et[∆cA,t+1] = −1
γ
(1− ω)Et[∆st+1] + 1
γ
rF,t (62)
Since the world interest rate R∗t is assumed to be constant and the debt elasticity (χ)
is small, rF,t is nearly constant and therefore asset holders’ consumption is closely
related with the response of terms-of-trade. In this model, exogenous government
spending shock crowds out asset holder’s consumption, so that terms-of-trade appre-
ciates(the third panel in the first row in figure 19). Consequently, trade balance can
deteriorate by the switching effect.
Although those two effects are mixed, given the trade price elasticity (σ < 1),
the absorption effect dominates the switching effect due to the similar process dis-
cussed in Monacelli et al. [2010] and therefore trade balance improves. Moreover,
appreciation of terms-of-trade due to decreasing in asset holders’ consumption is also
consistent with the empirical results.
On the contrary, the simulation results, especially the response of trade balance,
are largely changed under a fixed exchange rate regime. There are two potential
channels to alter the results: the UIP channel and the long-run PPP channel. First
of all, nominal interest rate is determined by the uncovered interest rate parity (UIP)
condition under a fixed exchange rate regime in this model. The monetary authority
can adjust nominal interest rate Rt under a floating exchange rate regime whereas
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domestic nominal interest is Rt fixed at the level of country specific interest rate RF,t
under a fixed exchange rate regime. Because the country specific interest rate (RF,t)
is almost constant, the domestic nominal interest Rt is also fixed, which implies
monetary policy is more accommodative under a fixed exchange rate regime. By the
Fisher relation, increasing in real interest rate is relatively smaller than that under
a floating exchange rate regime.63 Specifically, nominal interest rate is determined
by the following UIP condition in this model.
rt − rF,t = −Et∆et+1 (63)
Since rF,t is almost fixed, the monetary authority sets the domestic nominal interest
rate rt constant to keep change in nominal exchange rate zero. Since increasing in
real interest rate is relatively smaller than that under a floating regime, the size of
crowding-out is also smaller than that under a floating system by the equation (61).
Contrary to the floating regime case, however, the domestic price level P should
revert back to the original level under a fixed exchange rate regime since nominal
exchange rate is fixed and purchasing power parity (PPP) holds in the long run.64
Thus the domestic inflation should be negative at some points (the first panel in the
third row in figure 20), which means that real interest rate should increase. Thus
the long-run PPP effect crowds out asset holders’ consumption through the rela-
tion (61). Although asset holders’ consumption is determined by the size of two
63Born et al. [2013b] show that the short-term real interest rate (rt − pit+1) actually declines
initially.
64Intuitively, each domestic firm increases its price to respond positive government spending
initially. However, when the stimulus effect of government spending is weak, each firm down its
own price to compete in foreign markets to maximize its profit. Since nominal exchange rate
depreciates proportionally over time after positive government spending shock under a floating
exchange regime, firms do not need to down their price level. In contrast to the floating case, each
firm should down its price level under a fixed regime to compete in foreign markets since nominal
exchange rate is fixed. Detailed discussion in Corsetti et al. [2011].
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effects, decreasing in asset holders’ consumption is smaller than that under a float-
ing exchange rate regime due to the UIP channel (the first panel in the second row
in figure 20). Since asset holders’ consumption declines less, government spending
boosts output more than that under a floating regime and therefore disposable in-
come of non-asset holders increases more. As a result, aggregate consumption can
be increasing in contrast to the floating regime case given the fraction λ. By the
absorption effect, trade balance deteriorates.
It is worth noting that terms-of-trade still appreciates under a peg system since
asset holders’ consumption declines and the sign of the response of terms-of-trade
is determined by the asset holders’ consumption. At qualitative points of view, this
model successfully replicates the empirical results.
III.4.4 The 1980s Anormaly
In this section, I examine the effects of slow-adjusting taxes on net exports and terms-
of-trade to explain the twin deficit in the 1980s. In the 1980s, the Reagan increases
government spending largely for the military build-up and reduces tax to boost the
economy therefore government debts increase explosively.65 Huge tax cut stimulates
non-asset holders’ consumption, thereby aggregate consumption and import can also
be stimulated.
First, in order to examine the effect of slow-adjusting taxes, I assume that taxes
does not respond to government spending.(ψtg = 0) and compare to the baseline
simulation which is the same in section III.4.3 with a floating regime. Small ψtg
means that taxes are less sensitive to increasing in government spending, which can
be interpreted as slow-adjusting taxes.
To compare with the baseline and the slow-adjusting taxes case, non-asset hold-
65Detailed discussions of tax and budget policy in 1980s are provided in Feldstein [1994].
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ers’ consumption (the second panel in the second row in figure 21) is larger in the
slow-adjusting taxes case than that in the baseline case. Because of slow-adjusting
taxes, disposable income is increasing more through non-asset holders’ budget con-
straint, which drives increasing in hand-to-mouth consumers’ consumption. At the
same time, asset holders’ consumption is lower in the slow-adjusting taxes case than
that in the baseline case since asset holders expect the heavier tax burden in future.
The government should issue bonds more with the slow tax adjustment by the gov-
ernment budget constraint thus the future tax burden of asset holders is increasing
and therefore negative wealth effect becomes more stronger. The stronger negative
wealth effects crowd out asset holders’ consumption more.
Though two effects are mixed, given parameters, trade balance deteriorates more
by the absorption effect with the slow-adjusting taxes than that in the baseline case,
but the size of trade deficit is small (the second panel in the first row in figure 20).
However, if the fraction of non-asset holder (λ) increases for some reasons,66 the slow
tax adjustment process boosts aggregate consumption of non-asset holders more as
in Gali et al. [2007b], which drives larger trade deficit. Moreover, terms-of-trade
appreciates in response to government spending shock (the third panel in the first
row in figure 20) because of decline in asset holders’ consumption in both low and
high λ case.
To summarize, government spending shock with slow-adjusting taxes stimulates
hand-to-mouth consumers’ consumption and also import more than that without
slow adjustment, which possibly makes trade deficit even with a floating exchange
rate regime, albeit the size of trade deficit is sensitive to the fraction of hand-to-
66For example, the US economy experienced severe recessions in early 1980s. Garcia et al. [1997]
and Fissel and Jappelli [1990] show that the fraction of liquidity constraint consumers tend to
increase in recessions. Moreover, Gali et al. [2007b] estimate λ close to 0.5 with 1954 to 2004 US
data. Campbell and Mankiw [1989] also report that λ is close to 0.5. Bilbiie et al. [2008] estimate
λ close to 0.5 with 1957 to 1979 US data.
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mouth consumer.
III.5 Concluding Remarks
This paper examines effects of structural changes on the relation between govern-
ment budget balances and external balances. Through a time-varying structural
VAR model and the post WWII data for the US economy, the following four empir-
ical results are obtained: (1) In the Bretton Woods era, increasing in government
spending leads trade deficits. (2) Opposite to the Bretton Woods era, increasing
in government spending induces trade surplus in the post-Bretton Woods era. (3)
Anomaly in the 1980s: Trade deficits are caused by a government spending shock in
1980s in spite of adopting a floating exchange regime in the US. (4) The response
of terms-of-trade is stable across the periods: Appreciation (increasing in value of
real dollar) after initial small depreciation. To provide some insights about empir-
ical results, I construct a small open economy New Keynesian model incorporated
rule-of-thumb consumers suggested by Gali et al. [2007b]. An exchange rate regime
change and rule-of-thumb consumers may be useful to understand the results (1) and
(2). Slow-adjusting taxes may be useful to understand the result (3).
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CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSION
This dissertation studies the effects of fiscal policy on the economy at the macroeco-
nomic level using various empirical models and the New Keynesian perspective.
In Chapter II, I focus on the state-dependent effects of government debt on gov-
ernment spending multipliers using state-dependent impulse responses drawn by the
two-states local projection method, US historical data, and a government spending
shock identified by the defense news variable constructed by Ramey [2012], and up-
dated by Owyang et al. [2013]. For the estimation, a new quarterly historical US
government debt data from 1890.Q1 to 2010.Q4 is constructed. The empirical results
reveal that the spending multipliers in a high debt state are larger those in a low
debt state, at least, in short-run, which is contrary to the conventional prediction.
To provide a possible channel to understand the result, I construct a simple New
Keynesian model. The simple model suggests that spending reversals and the inter-
action between those spending reversals and monetary policy in a high debt state
could be a potential channel to understand the large short-run multipliers in a high
debt state. The empirical and theoretical results may imply that the short-run stim-
ulus effects of government spending depends not only on current spending but also
on future spending plans. Thus, it is important to manage households expectation
of future spending plans for the performance of a fiscal stimulus package as well as
fiscal consolidation.
In Chapter III, I examine effects of structural changes on the relation between
government budget balances and external balances. Through a time-varying struc-
tural VAR model and the post WWII data for the US economy, the following four
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empirical results are obtained: (1) In the Bretton Woods era, increasing in govern-
ment spending leads trade deficits. (2) Opposite to the Bretton Woods era, increasing
in government spending induces trade surplus in the post-Bretton Woods era. (3)
Anomaly in the 1980s: Trade deficits are caused by a government spending shock in
1980s in spite of adopting a floating exchange regime in the US. (4) The response
of terms-of-trade is stable across the periods: Appreciation (increasing in value of
real dollar) after initial small depreciation. To provide some insights about empir-
ical results, I construct a small open economy New Keynesian model incorporated
rule-of-thumb consumers suggested by Gali et al. [2007b]. An exchange rate regime
change and rule-of-thumb consumers may be useful to understand the results (1) and
(2). Slow-adjusting taxes may be useful to understand the result (3).
This dissertation could be extended in several directions. For Chapter II, it is
important to construct other historical macroeconomic data and to investigate trans-
mission channels of government spending. Particularly, the simple theory suggests
that the responses of consumption and real interest rate may significantly differ by
the level of debt. Thus it is worth constructing historical household consumption and
real interest data and investigating how responses of those variables to a spending
shock depend on the level of debt. For Chapter II, a rigorous theoretical model to
explain the empirical results is worth developing. Although the theoretical model
that I construct provides a potential channel to understand the empirical results,
the model omits several important dimensions such as investment dynamics, and
other frictions. Moreover, it could be important to introduce nominal interest rate
zero lower bound and to study the interaction between nonlinear fiscal policy and
monetary policy at the zero lower bound.
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APPENDIX A
DETAILS OF GIBBS SAMPLING
In this paper, the TVP-VAR model is estimated with Bayesian Markov chain
Monte Carlo(MCMC) techniques proposed by Cogley and Sargent [2005], Primiceri
[2005] and Canova and Ciccarelli [2009]. The procedures are mainly based on Prim-
iceri [2005] with minor modifications proposed by Canova and Ciccarelli [2009] for
the calibration of the priors. It is convenient to define two notations.
xτ = [x
′
1, · · · , x
′
τ ]
′, M τ = [m
′
1, · · · ,m
′
τ ]
′
The former one denotes a generic vector of variables x up to a time τ . The later
denotes a generic matrix M with its column vector m constructed by the time varying
components of M up to time τ . Gibbs sampling is conducted with the following four
steps.
Step 1: Drawing coefficient states BT . Conditional on the data and AT ,ΣT and
V , the measurement equation (26) is a standard linear-Gaussian model with known
variance. As shown in Carter and Kohn [1994], the density P (BT |yT , AT ,ΣT , V ) can
be factored as
p(BT |yT , AT ,ΣT , V ) = p(BT |yT , AT ,ΣT , V )
T−1∏
t=1
p(Bt|Bt+1, yt, AT ,ΣT , V ) (64)
where
Bt |Bt+1, yt, AT ,ΣT , V ∼ N(Bt|t+1, Pt|t+1) (65)
BT | yT , AT ,ΣT , V ∼ N(BT |T , PT |T ) (66)
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Bt|t+1 = E[Bt|Bt+1, yt, AT ,ΣT , V ] (67)
Pt|t+1 = V ar(Bt|Bt+1, yt, AT ,ΣT , V ) (68)
p denotes a density function, N is the normal distribution and E is the expectation
operator. Since the measurement equation (26) and the state equation (27) has a
standard linear-Gaussian form, the standard Kalman filter and the backward recur-
sion can be applied to draw coefficient states similar in Primiceri [2005]. Specifically,
the forward Kalman filter delivers BT |T and PT |T which is mean and variance of
the posterior of BT as its last recursion point. The first point of backward recur-
sion is drawn from N(BT |T , PT |T ). Furthermore, using BT |T , PT |T and the backward
recursion, the remaining can be drawn from N(Bt|t+1, Pt|t+1), t = 1, · · · , T − 1.
Step 2: Drawing covariance states AT . The measurement equation (26) can be
rewritten as
At(yt −X ′tBt) = Atyˆt = Σtεt (69)
Note that conditional on BT , yˆt can be observable. Because At has a particular
form(lower triangular with ones on the main diagonal), the equation (69) can be
written as follows:
yˆt = Ztαt + Σtεt (70)
where Zt is an n× n(n+1)2 matrix given by
Zt =

0 · · · · · · 0
−yˆ1,t 0 · · · 0
0 (−yˆ1,t,−yˆ2,t) . . . ...
...
. . . . . . 0
0 · · · 0 (−yˆ1,t, · · · ,−yˆn,t)

(71)
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Unfortunately, the standard Kalman filter and the backward recursion cannot be
applied since the system is Gaussian but non-linear since the dependent variable in
the measurement equation appears on the Zt in general cases. However, Primiceri
[2005] shows that the system becomes linear under the block diagonal assumption of
S. Under the assumption of S, therefore, the same procedure in appendix B.1 allows
to recover αt and associated variance Λt by
αi,t|t+1 = E[αi,t|αi,t+1, yt, BT ,ΣT , V ] (72)
Λi,t|t+1 = V ar(αi,t|αi,t+1, yt, BT ,ΣT , V ) (73)
αi,t |αi,t+1, yt, BT ,ΣT , V ∼ N(αi,t|i,t+1,Λi,t|i,t+1) (74)
where αi,t is the i-th block of αt and Λi,t is associated variance.
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Step 3: Drawing volatility states ΣT . Conditional on BT , AT , V and data, the
measurement equation (26) can be rewritten as
At(yt −X ′tBt) = y∗t = Σtεt (75)
where y∗t can be observable conditional on B
T and AT . This system itself is non-linear
but taking squaring and logarithm of every elements in the equation, the following
linear equation system is derived.
y∗∗t = 2ht + et (76)
ht = ht−1 + ηt (77)
67Without block diagonal assumption, minor modifications for the procedures are needed. De-
tailed discussions are available in Appendix D in Primiceri [2005]
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where y∗∗i,t = log((y
∗
i,t)
2 + c∗), ei,t = log(ε2i,t), hi,t = log σi,t and i = 1, · · · , n.68 Since
ε’s and η’s are assumed to be independent, e’s and η’s are not correlated. The
transformed systems is linear but it is a non-Gaussian because e’s are distributed
as a logχ2. Fortunately, this linear but non-Gaussian model can be approximated
to a linear-Gaussian state space form with mixture normal density by the method
proposed by Kim et al. [1998]. The mixture density is given by
p(ei,t) ≈
7∑
j=1
qjpN(ei,t;mj − 1.2704, υ2j ) (78)
where qj is probability, mj is mean, υ
2
j is variance, pN is a normal density function.
qj, mj and υ
2
j are known constants chosen to match a number of moments of the
logχ2(1). In appendix A, the choice of qj, mj and υ
2
j is reported. Conditioning
on the realization of an random indicator variable si,t, one element of the mixture
normal density is selected. In other words,
ei,t | si,t = j ∼ N(mj − 1.2704, υ2j ), i = 1, · · · , n j = 1, · · · , 7 (79)
The standard Kalman filter and the backward recursion can be applied the approxi-
mated linear-Gaussian system to draw ht given a selection of s
T = [s1, · · · , sT ]′, BT ,
AT and V as in appendix A.
Note that as in Kim et al. [1998], the random indicator variable si,t can be drawn
conditional on a history of y∗∗i,t and the new hi,t using the following density.
Pr(si,t = j|y∗∗i,t , hi,t) ∝ qjpN (y∗∗i,t |2hi,t+mj−1.2704, v2j ), i = 1, · · · , n j = 1, · · · , 7 (80)
68c∗ is the offset constant which is set to be 0.001 following Primiceri [2005]. This constant is
introduced in order to robustify the estimation procedure to y∗∗t being very small. See Kim et al.
[1998]
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Step 4: Drawing hyperparameters V . The hyperparameters in this model are the
diagonal blocks of variance matrix V : Q(coefficient states), W (volatility states) and
the block diagonal of S(covariance states). Taking BT , AT , ΣT and yT as given, all
innovations are observable. Since all innovations are assumed to be independent to
each others, each square block has an inverse-Wishart posterior distribution and is
easily drown from these inverse-Wishart posterior given the proper priors.
Gibbs sampling for state space models A measurement equation is given by
yt = Htβt + εt (81)
and state equation is
βt = Fβt−1 + ut (82)
where εt
ut
 ∼ i.i.d N(
0
0
 ,
Rt 0
0 Q
) (83)
Let
βt|s = E[βt|Y s, Hs, Rs, Q] (84)
Vt|s = V ar(βt|Y s, Hs, Rs, Q) (85)
Given initial β0|0 and V0|0, the standard Kalman filter gives:
βt|t−1 = Fβt−1|t−1 (86)
Vt|t−1 = FVt−1|t−1F ′ +Q (87)
βt|t = βt|t−1 + Vt|t−1H ′t(HtVt|t−1H
′
t +Rt)
−1(yt −Htβt|t−1) (88)
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Vt|t = Vt|t−1 − Vt|t−1H ′t(HtVt|t−1H ′t +Rt)−1HtVt|t−1 (89)
Note that Vt|t−1H ′t(HtVt|t−1H
′
t+Rt)
−1 is the Kalman gain. The last recursion elements
βT |T and VT |T are the mean and the variance of the posterior of βT |T . With factored
density of βT and the backward recursion, βT−1 can be obtained. This procedures
continues until time zero given updating equations of the backward recursion:
βt|t+1 = βt|t + Vt|tF ′V −1t+1|t(βt+1 − Fβt|t) (90)
Vt|t+1 = Vt|t − Vt|tF ′V −1t+1|tFVt|t (91)
Selection of the mixing distribution to be logχ2(1) is as follows.
ω qj = Pr(ω = j) mj υ
2
j
1 0.00730 -10.12999 5.79596
2 0.10556 -3.97281 2.61369
3 0.00002 -8356686 5.1795
4 0.04395 2.77786 0.16735
5 0.34001 0.61942 0.64009
6 0.24566 1.79518 0.34023
7 0.2575 -1.08819 1.26261
Source:Kim et al. [1998]
Calibration of the priors is as follows In most TVP-VAR studies, priors are cali-
brated with OLS estimators from an initial “trained data” which is then discarded.
As opposed to most previous TVP-VAR studies, I use full sample OLS estimators to
calibrate the priors following Canova and Ciccarelli [2009] for two reasons.69 First,
I do not want to sacrifice some initial data points. With the trained data method,
some initial data points of Brettonwoods system should be discarded, which possibly
69In Kirchner et al. [2010] and Rafiq [2012], they also use full sample OLS estimators to calibrate
their priors.
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misguided the effects of nominal exchange regime. Secondly, this methods minimize
the uncertain involved in calibrating the priors properly as described in Canova and
Ciccarelli [2009].
VAR coefficients are as follows Let BOLS be the OLS estimator from the full-
sample time invariant VAR and ΞB is its variance-covariance matrix. Following
Primiceri [2005], B0 the prior for B are assumed to be
B0 ∼ N(BOLS, 4× ΞB) (92)
Covariance states are as follows Let AOLS be the Cholesky components(lower
triangular matrix) in the time invariant VAR and ΞA be its variance-covariance
matrix. The prior of covariance states of the model is assumed to be
A0 ∼ N(AOLS, 4× ΞA) (93)
This specification is the same one in Primiceri [2005]
Volatility states are as follows Let log σ0 be the OLS estimators of variance ma-
trix(diagonal matrix of Cholesky decomposition) in time invariant VAR. The prior
for volatility states is assumed to be
log σ0 ∼ N(log σOLS, In) (94)
which is similar to the one in Primiceri [2005] and Canova and Gambetti [2009].
Hyperparameters are as follows The prior for Q, the variance-covariance matrix
for Bt, is set to be
Q ∼ IW (κ2Q × (dim(BOLS) + 1)× ΞB, dim(BOLS) + 1) (95)
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Following Primiceri [2005], I set κQ = 0.01. dim(BOLS) + 1 is set to be the degree of
freedom of the inverse-wishart prior. The degree of freedom which I choose is widely
used in time varying parameter VAR literatures such as Benati and Mumtaz [2007],
Kirchner et al. [2010], Pereira and Lopes [2010] and Rafiq [2012]. Also, dim(BOLS)+1
is the minimum number of degrees of freedom for the appropriate priors.70
The prior of W , the variance-covariance matrix for the innovations of log σt, is
assumed to be
W ∼ IW (κ2W × (dim(σOLS) + 1)× In, dim(σOLS) + 1) (96)
Following Primiceri [2005], κQ = 0.1. Following Benati and Mumtaz [2007], I set the
degree of freedom of inverse-wishart to dim(σOLS) + 1 which is the minimum degree
of freedom for the prior.
The prior S, the variance-covariance matrix of At, is set to be
Sj ∼ IW (κ2S × (j + 1)× Ξj,A, j + 1) j = 1, · · · , 3 (97)
where S1 to S3 denote the blocks of S, Ξ1,A to Ξ3,A denote the associated blocks of
ΞA and κS = 0.1 which is the same in Primiceri [2005]. All numbers for the priors
such as κQ, κW and κS are standard and consistent with Primiceri [2005].
70It does not seem that there is a consensus to set degrees of freedom for priors in TVP-VAR
studies. Most TVP-VAR studies with full sample calibrated priors use the strategy that the degree
of freedom is set to be the size of the vector BOLS + 1, the minimum degree of freedom for the
prior. However, in Canova and Ciccarelli [2009], they use the number which is approximately same
with the sample size. In Koop et al. [2009], they stress out that the degrees of freedom which they
choose is less than the size of the data though they use the training sample method.
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APPENDIX B
TABLES AND FIGURES
Table 1. Explanatory Power of the Defence News Variable
State Adj R-square F-statistics Marginal F-statistics Number of Obs
Linear 0.1311 25.20 18.40 484
High debt 0.1871 15.57 8.92 193
Low debt 0.1348 15.59 15.97 291
Notes: The second and third column show statistics from a regression of log real
per capita spending on current and four lags of the news variable (normalized by
lagged GDP). The fourth column shows the joint significance of current and four
lags of the news variable in a regression of log real per capita spending on a cubic
trend, current and four lags of the news variable, and four lags of log real per capita
spending, log real per capita GDP, log of real per capita debt, and nominal interest
rate.
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Table 2. Robustness: Different Time Trends, Thresholds, and Other Specification
Cumulative multipliers Difference
State 1year 2year 3year 4year 5year 1year 5year
35% Threshold
High 0.80 0.73 0.72 0.72 0.77
-0.46 -1.12Low 1.27 0.90 1.21 1.36 1.77
60% Threshold
High 1.33 1.00 0.77 0.53 0.40
0.81 -0.42Low 0.51 0.62 0.71 0.76 0.82
Quartic trend
Linear 0.73 0.76 0.82 0.85 0.94
High 0.98 0.82 0.71 0.60 0.57
0.29 -0.44Low 0.69 0.77 0.86 0.91 1.00
Quadratic trend
Linear 0.68 0.69 0.75 0.78 0.85
High 0.95 0.67 0.52 0.38 0.21
0.39 -0.63Low 0.56 0.65 0.75 0.78 0.84
First difference
Linear 0.56 0.63 0.70 0.72 0.77
High 1.01 0.85 0.80 0.78 0.82
0.45 -0.02Low 0.56 0.66 0.74 0.78 0.84
Additional controls
Linear 0.70 0.70 0.68 0.77 0.85
High 1.26 1.18 0.75 0.80 0.82
0.67 0.00Low 0.60 0.65 0.98 0.75 0.82
Exclude World War II
Linear 1.18 0.87 0.73 0.88 0.93
High 2.50 0.89 0.66 0.25 -0.04
1.6 -0.95Low 0.90 0.80 0.85 0.87 0.91
Post World War II
Linear 0.72 0.57 0.57 0.41 0.50
High 0.88 0.45 0.19 -0.13 -0.37
0.60 -1.85Low 0.29 1.30 1.22 1.22 1.49
Blanchard-Perotti
Linear 0.24 0.51 0.68 0.84 0.98
High 0.25 0.20 0.01 -0.24 -0.62
-0.13 -1.73Low 0.37 0.70 0.86 0.96 1.12
Notes: ‘First difference’ means that the estimation with the first difference of the
controls. ‘Additional controls’ means that the estimation with the controls in the
baseline, unemployment, and credit spreads. ‘Excluding WWII’ indicates the results
with the data excluding WWII (1939.Q3 to 1946.Q4). ‘Blanchard-Perotti’ indicates
the results with Blanchard and Perotti [2002] method.
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Table 3. Calibration
Description Value Parameter Source
discount factor 0.99 β standard RBC
risk aversion coefficient 1 σ log utility
inverse Frisch elasticity 1 φ standard RBC
price stickiness 0.8 ξ Gali et al. [2007a]
price elasticity of demand 11  Corsetti et al. [2012a]
production function 0.3 α Corsetti et al. [2012a]
government spending persistence
1.32 ψ1gg estimation
-0.18 ψ2gg estimation
-0.2 ψ3gg estimation
responsiveness of spending to debt
0.2 ψHgd Corsetti et al. [2012a]
0 ψLgd Corsetti et al. [2012a]
contemporaneous response of spending
0.01 ψHgnews estimation
0.08 ψLgnews estimation
debt sensitivity of lump-sum tax 0.02 ψtd Corsetti et al. [2012a]
monetary policy 1.5 φpi Gali et al. [2007a]
steady state G/Y 20% Corsetti et al. [2012a]
threshold 45% baseline estimation
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Table 5. Detailed Data Source of US Gross Federal Debt
Period Source
1890.Jan - 1937.Nov Monthly statement of public debt(MSPD)
: aggregate section(before 1915.Aug).
gross debt section(after 1915.Aug).
1937.Dec - 1969.Sep Treasury bulletin: table 1 in debt outstanding section
and composition of debt table
1969.Dec - 2010.4Q Treasury bulletin: FD-1 table
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Table 6. Calibration
description value parameter source
discount factor 0.99 β standard RBC
risk aversion coefficient 1 γ log utility
inverse Frisch elasticity 1 φ standard RBC
elasticity of trade price 0.7 σ Monacelli et al. [2010]
price stickiness 0.75 ξ Gali and Monacelli [2005]
price elasticity of demand 11  Corsetti et al. [2011]
import share 0.2 ω Data
monetary policy 1.5 φpi Gali and Monacelli [2005]
debt elasticity of interest rate 0.00001 χ Corsetti et al. [2009]
non-asset holder 1/3(1/2) λ Born et al. [2013b]
government spending persistence 0.9 ψgg Born et al. [2013b]
debt elasticity of spending 0(-0.05) ψgd Gali et al. [2007b]
tax finance 0.5(0) ψtg Corsetti et al. [2009]
debt elasticity of taxes 0.02 ψtd Corsetti et al. [2011]
steady state G/Y 0.2 Data
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Figure 1. Debt-to-GDP Ratio and News Variable
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Notes: Shaded areas indicate that the debt-to-GDP ratio exceeds 45%.
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Figure 2. Impulse Response in the Linear Model
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Notes: Shaded areas indicate the associated 95% confidence interval. The
response of government spending is measured in percentage of GDP. The re-
sponses of GDP and debt are measured in percentage deviations. The response
of interest rate is measured in basis points.
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Figure 3. State-dependent Impulse Response
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Notes: Blue solid lines and lines with circle are the response in a high debt
state and a low debt state, respectively. Shaded areas and dotted lines are the
associated 95% confidence interval. Changes in variables are measured in the
same unit as in figure .
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Figure 4. Cumulative Multipliers
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Notes: The panel is the cumulative multipliers in the linear model and the
state dependent model, respectively. 95% confidence intervals are reported.
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Figure 5. Impulse Response in the Linear Model with Tax Rates
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Notes: Shaded areas indicate 95% confidence interval. The response of govern-
ment spending is measured in percentage of GDP. The responses of GDP and
debt are measured in percentage deviations. The responses of interest rate and
tax rate are measured in basis points.
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Figure 6. State-dependent Impulse Response with Tax Rates
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Notes: Blue solid lines and lines with circle are the response in a high debt
state and a low debt state, respectively. Shaded regions and dotted lines are
the associated 95% confidence interval. Changes in variables are measured in
the same unit as in figure .
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Figure 7. The Ratio of Cumulative Tax Receipts to Cumulative Government
Spending
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Figure 8. Cumulative Multipliers
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Notes: The panel is the cumulative multipliers in the linear model, in a low
debt state, and in a high debt state, respectively. 95% confidence intervals are
reported.
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Figure 9. Selected Impulse Responses to a Defense News Shock
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Notes: Quantities are measured in deviations from the steady state normalized
by steady state output. Interest rate and inflation are measured in % deviations
from the steady state.
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Figure 10. Selected Impulse Responses to a Defense News Shock: Non-linear
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Notes Quantities are measured in deviations from the steady state normalized
by steady state output. Interest rate and inflation are measured in % deviations
from the steady state.
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Figure 11. Impulse Response of Selected Variables in Sub-sample VAR
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Figure 12. Median Response of NX to Government Spending
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band.
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Figure 13. Median Response of NX to Government Spending: 3D-plot
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Figure 14. Median Response of Terms-of-trade to Government Spending
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Figure 15. Median Response of Terms-of-trade to Government Spending: 3D-plot
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Figure 16. Median Response of GDP to Government Spending
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Figure 17. Median Response of GDP to Government Spending: 3D-plot
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Figure 18. Median Response of Government Spending to Government Spending
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Figure 19. Median Response of Government Spending to Government Spending:
3D-plot
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Figure 20. Impulse Response of Selected Variables to Government Spending Shock
under Different Exchange Rate Regime
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Figure 21. Impulse Response of Selected Variables to Government Spending Shock
with Slow Adjusting Taxes
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